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Autumn 2000 NO. 90

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The cover. Yoko-e print by Utamaro Kitagawa, published by Maruya Bunemon ca. 1794.

Famous Beauties of the Kansei Era (1789–1801). Contributing to the particular charm of this print is the fresh informality and naturalistic ease of posture of the woman on the right, caught by the artist to convey the psychology of focused attention. The angle of her body and direction of her gaze serve to point the viewer's eye to the hand about to make its move. Utamaro loved to play go and featured the game in a number of his works. The only example that is known to remain of this work's original print run is part of the collection of the Honolulu Academy of Arts and is prized by the go community therefore all the more, beyond even its worth to the art world.

See *Japanese Prints and the World of Go* by William Pinckard at <http://www.kiseido.com/>.

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Go World News

August~October 2000

by John Power

International

Cho Hun-hyun triumphs in Fujitsu Cup

Cho Hun-hyun of Korea has scored his second triumph in the Fujitsu Cup. In the final of the 13th Cup, held in Tokyo on 12 August, he defeated Chang Hao of China; playing black, Cho forced Chang to resign after 203 moves and so won his second Fujitsu Cup (he also won the 7th Cup in 1994). This was Cho's second international title this year, following his win in the 12th TV Asia Cup and his seventh international title overall. Anyone would say that Cho is having a great year, but in the TV interview after his victory he complained that he was in bad form. Actually, that was borne out by his results in Korea, which at this point were 16-16 for the year, not what you'd expect from a player of his stature. Obviously he has the ability to rise to the occasion.

In the play-off for 3rd place, Mok Jin-seuk 5-dan of Korea (W) defeated Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan of Japan by half a point, so this year's Fujitsu Cup was dominated by Korea. Thanks to his win, Mok gets a personal seeded place in the next Fujitsu Cup.

For those who like to keep track, this was Korea's 24th victory in the 45 international titles held to date (see GW89, page 5 for our criteria for tournaments counted).

See page 35 for a commentary on the final.

5th Samsung Cup final: Yamada vs. Yoo

This year's Samsung Cup final will feature a clash between Japan and Korea. Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan of Korea will be shooting for his fourth world title (he's won two Fujitsu Cups and one Ing Cup), while his opponent, Yamada Kimio 8-dan of Japan, has already posted his best-ever international performance just by reaching the final.

Below is a step-by-step account of the tournament.

1. Korean 1-dans star in qualifying tournament

The Samsung Cup is unique in that it holds an international qualifying round for non-seeded players in Korea some weeks before the main tournament is held. Overseas players have to pay their own expenses, which is not something top go professionals are accustomed to.

This year's qualifying tournament, held in Seoul from 27 to 31 July, was notable for remarkable performances by young Koreans stars. 191 players, including the WAGC champion, Sakai Hideyuki, and three other amateurs, competed for 16 places in the main tournament; nine Koreans were successful, of whom six were teenagers and three were 1-dans.

In Japan there's a satirical saying: 'Throw a stone and you'll hit a 9-dan.' In Korea there's an even more pointed saying: '9-dans can't beat 1-dans.'

2. Zhou repeats win over Lee, but Koreans dominate first three rounds

In the main tournament, the most interesting game came in the second round. Zhou Heyang 8-dan, currently rated number two in China, scored his third successive win over Lee Chang-ho (the first was the 1997 Fujitsu cup and the second in this year's Fujitsu Cup). It's too early to claim that Zhou is Lee's nemesis, but other top players are certainly in his debt, as his wins ensure that the international titles will be spread around more this year.

Another point of interest in the second round was that Chang Hao of China was eliminated, thus ending his good run in international tournaments this year.

In the quarterfinals, three of the four games were won by Korean representatives. It could have been four, but Rui Naiwei apparently squandered numerous winning chances and lost her game to Yamada Kimio of Japan.

Below are partial results from the first round and full results from the next two (unfortunately, we don't have full details of all games).

Round 1 (30 August, Seoul). Yokota Shigeaki 9-dan (Japan, Kansai Ki-in) (W) beat Yang Keun 5-dan (Korea) by resig., Lee Chang-ho (Korea) (B) b. Nakano Hiro-nari 9-dan by resig., Zhou Heyang 8-dan (China) (B) b. Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan (Japan) by 1½, Ko Mosei 8-dan (Japan) (W) b. Lee Hun-uk 4-dan (Korea) by ½, Yamada Kimio (W) beat Won Seung-jin 3-dan (Korea) by 2½, Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan (Japan) by resig., Choi Myung-hun 7-dan (Korea) (B) b. Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) by 1½, Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Ryu Shikun 7-dan (Japan) by 10½, Park Sung-cheul 1-dan (Korea) (B) b. Cho Sonjin 9-dan (Japan) by 2½.

Round 2 (1 September, Seoul). Zhou Heyang (China) b. Lee Chang-ho (Korea), Yang Jae-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yokota Shigeaki 9-dan (Japan) by resig., Yamada (Japan) (B) b. Park Sung-cheul 1-dan (Korea) by resig., Cho (Korea) (W) b. Ko Mosei (Japan) by resig., Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea) b. Chang Hao 9-dan (China), Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Korea) b. Lee Se-dol 3-dan (Korea), Kang Ji-seung 4-dan (Korea) b. Choi Myung-hun 7-dan (Korea), Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea) b. Kim 1-dan (Korea).

Quarterfinals (early October). Yoo b. Kang, Yamada b. Rui, Seo b. Cho, Yang b. Zhou.

3. Semifinals

The semifinals were held on 26 October. In one, Yamada (W) defeated Seo Bongsoo by 1½ points; in the other, Yoo-Chang-hyuk (B) defeated Yang Jae-ho by resignation.

4th Ing Cup final: Lee vs. Chang Hao

Like the Fujitsu Cup, the Ing Cup final is a China-Korea pairing. The Chinese player is the same, Chang Hao, but the Korean player this time is Lee Chang-ho. The latter is reported to be taking this tournament very

seriously; not only would victory nicely fill a gap in his portfolio, it would also extend the Korean monopoly of the Ing Cup.

The best-of-three semifinals were held in Korea on 22, 24 and 26 August. Lee defeated Yu Bin of China 2-0 in one and Chang Hao edged O Meien 2-1 in the other.

Chang Hao has been in a bit of a slump this year, falling from first to third place in the Chinese rating list. However, this is the kind of bad form — his second world championship final in a row — that most other players would envy.

The results:

Lee vs. Yu) Game 1: Lee (W) won by 4½ points; Game 2: Lee (B) won by resig.

Chang vs. O) Game 1: Chang (B) won by resig.; Game 2: O (B) won by 2½ points; Game 3: Chang (B) won by resig.

Rui wins 1st China Eastern Airlines Cup

China has launched its second international title, this one a women's world championship sponsored by China Eastern Airlines. To nobody's surprise, the first Cup was won by Rui Naiwei.

According to the Japanese, the invitation arrived too late for them to field their women's title holders, who were scheduled to play in the Women's Kakusei Cup at the same time as the opening rounds of the international tournament. Only one title holder, Shinkai Hiroko, winner of the 1st Strongest Woman Professional title, was able to participate; she was joined by Ogawa Tomoko 6-dan, whom we reluctantly have to label a 'veteran player' nowadays, and Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan.

Tournament conditions are unusual for an international tournament: 70 minutes per player with no byo-yomi (= sudden death). First prize is 90,000 yuan (about \$9,000). The whole tournament was played on four days straight (18-21 August) in Shanghai.

Below are the results.

Round 1. Svetlana Chikchina (Russia) beat Janice Kim 1-dan (USA), Xu Ying 3-dan (China) b. Diana Koszegi (Hungary), Li Chunhua 4-dan (China) b. Lee (Korea), Hua Xueming 7-dan (China) b. Shinkai Hi-

roko 5-dan (Japan), Park Ji-un (Korea) b. Ye Gui 5-dan (China), Zhang Xuan 8-dan (China) b. Zhang (Chinese Taipei), Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan (Japan) b. Ogawa Tomoko 6-dan (Japan), Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Korea) b. Feng Yun 9-dan (China).

Round 2. Xu b. Chikchina, Li b. Hua, Park b. Zhang, Rui b. Kobayashi.

Semifinals. Xu beat Li, Rui beat Park.

Final. Rui beat Xu 2-0.

2nd Hung Chang Cup starts

The first two rounds of the 2nd Hung Chang Cup, a Korean-sponsored women's world championship, were played on 28 and 30 September. Winning their way through to the quarterfinals were four Korean players, three Chinese and one Japanese. The last was Aoki Kikuyo, who had just won promotion to 8-dan. She will play Rui Naiwei next. Korea's two teenage stars, Cho Hye-yeon 2-dan and Park Ji-un 2-dan, also made the quarterfinals. Cho beat Guo Juan of Europe in the second round and plays Zhang Xuan 8-dan of China next. Park beat Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan of Japan in the second round and next plays Hua Xueming 7-dan of China.

Korea wins Japan-Korea Go Exchange

The Japan-Korea Go Exchange is an unofficial series of goodwill matches between young players from Japan and Korea. On the Japanese side, it is mainly organized by Oya Koichi 8-dan, who gets together a group of Japanese players to visit Korea. This year it was held for the 7th time, and the Japanese team was made up of players visiting Korea to participate in the Samsung Cup preliminaries.

When we say 'young' players, that applies to the Korean side more than to the Japanese. There has been an explosion of interest in go among young people in Korea, resulting in the emergence of a very strong group of young professionals at the Korean Ki-in (Hanguk Kiwon). According to Oya, every year the Korean team seems to be getting younger and younger. This year almost all of their players were teenagers, whereas there was not one on the Japanese team.

The honours in the two-match series went to the youthful Korean team, which won 20-16. Korea has now won three years in a row and has an overall lead of 5-2. Oya himself scored 1-1. Best for the Japanese team were Yamashita Keigo, Akiyama Jiro, Nakano Hironari, Kurahashi Masayuki and Kiyonari Tetsuya, who all won both their games.

Korea wins fourth 'Tengen' play-off in a row

The fourth annual play-off between the holders of the Korean Chunweon and Chinese Tianyuan titles (both of which are equivalent to the Japanese Tengen; the play-off was initiated when Korea launched its version of the title) was held on Cheju Island, Korea, and Korea extended its monopoly of this title. Lee Chang-ho beat Chang Hao two games straight (games played on 16 and 18 September).

In the Japan-China Tengen series, China also lost the first four, but then won the next eight. Somehow, we can't see them duplicating this feat against Korea. Its success is not unrelated to the fact that Lee has monopolized the Korean title so far.

News from Japan

Yoda wins Meijin title

Coming from behind in the league

In the 25th Meijin league, Yoda probably surprised even himself by coming from behind to edge O Meien at the last minute. O had led most of the way in the Meijin league, but he stumbled in the final round, losing to Kato Masao. On the same day (3 August), Yoda beat Hane Naoki, the third player in the running for victory in the league, and so drew level with O on 6-2. Yoda then won the play-off, held on 7 August, by 2½ points.

This earned Yoda his second successive crack at the Meijin title. Last year he made the mistake of vowing to the go press that he would take the title, only to go down 1-4 to Cho. This year he was more circumspect, at least initially, but in his speech at the party held before the first game in Amsterdam, he proclaimed that he was going to win the opening game.

25th Meijin League (1999–2000)

24th Meijin: Cho Chikun

Player/Opponent	Y.N.	K.K.	R.S.	O.R.	K.M.	T.M.	O.M.	I.Y.	H.N.	won/lost
1. Yoda Norimoto	---	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	6-2
2. Kobayashi Koichi	0	---	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	3-5
3. Ryu Shikun	0	1	---	0	0	1	1	1	0	4-4
4. O Rissei	1	1	1	---	0	1	0	1	0	5-3
5. Kato Masao	0	0	1	1	---	0	1	1	0	4-4
6. Takemiya Masaki	0	0	0	0	1	---	0	1	0	2-6
7. O Meien	1	1	0	1	0	1	---	1	1	6-2
7. Imamura Yoshiaki	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	---	0	1-7
7. Hane Naoki	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	---	5-3

Yoda sweeps Cho in the title match

At the age of 34, in his 20th year as a professional, Yoda has finally fulfilled his promise and won his first big title. In the 25th Meijin title match, Yoda belatedly delivered on the prediction that he made last year and took the title from Cho Chikun. The match was surprisingly one-sided, with Cho unable to win a game. Obviously, Yoda played very well, but, even so, Cho seemed to lack his usual tenacity — this is the first time he has ever lost a best-of-seven series 0-4.

As we have frequently mentioned, Yoda's success in domestic tournaments has lagged behind his international success, so he will undoubtedly find his first win in a big-three title very gratifying. If things go right for him, Yoda is young enough and strong enough to dominate the Japanese tournament scene.

Cho now finds himself without a title to his name for the first time for 12 years (at least, that was how *Go Weekly* put it, but actually Cho is the current holder of the NEC Cup, so he's not completely out in the cold).



On the path to victory: Yoda (L) wins the second game. Joining in the analysis are Otake (centre), Takemiya (R) and Kobayashi Koichi (back to camera).

In fact, during that whole period he always held at least one top-three title, which is a record for longevity. Cho is now 44, so he may be past his peak, but it is hard to believe that the player who has dominated Japanese go for the past two decades will just fade away. The upcoming Oza title match with O Rissei may give him an opportunity to fight his way out of his slump.

Incidentally, one benefit for Japan from Yoda's win is that he will now be seeded in all the international tournaments. For the first time, we have a situation in which Japan's two most successful players internationally, Yoda and O Rissei, hold the top two titles.

The results:

Game 1 (6, 7 Sept.). Yoda (B) won by resig. (This game was held in Amsterdam, as one of the events commemorating 400 years of relations between Japan and Holland.)

Game 2 (20, 21 Sept.). Yoda (W) by resig.

Game 3 (27, 28 Sept.). Yoda (B) by resig.

Game 4 (11, 12 Oct.). Yoda (W) by resig.

26th Meijin league

Only one of the vacant league places has been filled to date. Komatsu Hideki 9-dan makes a comeback to the league after an eight-year absence, thanks to a win over Cho U 6-dan on 26 October.

Yamashita wins Gosei and Shinjin-O titles

As we reported in our previous issue, Yamashita Keigo 6-dan, the 21-year-old who is the best hope of the younger generation in Japan, made an excellent start to the 25th Gosei title, winning the first two games. However, the defending champion, Kobayashi Koichi, then made a determined fightback, taking the third and fourth games. This was all the more ominous because of what happened last year in this title: Kobayashi lost the first two games to the challenger, Yoda Norimoto, but then swept the next three.

In the final game, Kobayashi seemed to be doing well, but Yamashita fought back tenaciously and managed to stage an upset. His victory is a breath of fresh air for the



Victory in the 5th game gives Yamashita Keigo the Gosei title.

Japanese go world, which badly needs new young stars to match those appearing in China and Korea. Yamashita is the youngest player ever to win the Gosei title and the youngest to take a top title since Cho Chikun won the Pro Best Eight when he was 18.

Kobayashi was philosophical about his defeat, saying: 'For the sake of the go world, we have to have young players come up.'

Yamashita represents a new breed of go professional in Japan. He has no professional teacher, being a product of a go school, the Ryokusei Igo Gakuen (literally, 'Green Stars Igo College', originally the Ryokuseikai), run by top Japanese amateur Kikuchi Yasuro. This school is not actually a college but an organized study group that meets daily (Yamashita goes virtually every day that he's not playing a tournament game). In the last decade it has become a major force in professional go, having produced 15 professionals at the Nihon Ki-in.

Results:

Game 1 (8 July). Yamashita (W) by 8½.

Game 2 (13 July). Yamashita (B) by resig.

Game 3 (23 July). Kobayashi (B) by 3½.

Game 4 (23 August). Kobayashi (W) by 1½.

Game 5 (30 August). Yamashita (W) by 2½.

In the Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title, Yamashita set a new record by winning the title for the third year in a row. He defeated Hane Naoki 8-dan 2-0 in the title match (the games were played on 18 and 27 September).

Kisei challenger: Awaji or Cho Sonjin

The A league

The winner of the A league of the 25th Kisei tournament was decided after only four rounds. When Awaji Shuzo 9-dan won his game, taking his score to 4-0, he became unbeatable, as he was ranked higher than the only player with a chance of catching up with him. As it happened, Awaji lost his last game and Ryu Shikun did draw level; however, Ryu had to be content with second place.

The B league

In contrast, the B league went down to the wire. Unlike the A league, where Awaji had led all the way, the result was an upset the final round.

After four rounds, Ishida Yoshio had the same score as Awaji in the A league, that is, 4-0, but he had to win his final game, against Cho Sonjin, as the latter was ranked

25th Kisei Tournament: A League

Player/Opponent	C.C.	A.S.	I.T.	Y.K.	I.A.	R.S.	won/lost
1. Cho Chikun	---	0	1	1	1	0	3-2
2. Awaji Shuzo	1	---	1	0	1	1	4-1
3. Imamura Toshiya	0	0	---	1	0	0	1-4
4. Yo Kagen	0	1	0	---	0	0	1-4
5. Ishida Atsushi	0	0	1	1	---	0	2-3
6. Ryu Shikun	1	0	1	1	1	---	4-1

25th Kisei Tournament: B League

Player/Opponent	C.S.	I.Y.	M.G.	H.S.	H.N.	C.U.	won/lost
1. Cho Sonjin	---	1	1	1	1	0	4-1
2. Ishida Yoshio	0	---	1	1	1	1	4-1
3. Miyazawa Goro	0	0	---	1	1	0	2-3
4. Hasegawa Sunao	0	0	0	---	0	0	0-5
5. Hikosaka Naoto	0	0	0	1	---	1	2-3
6. Cho U	1	0	1	1	0	---	3-2

higher and had only one loss. This he failed to, so he was pipped at the post. This must have been a disappointment for Ishida and for his many fans, who were looking forward to the prospect of his coming out of his decades-long hibernation.

Awaji and Cho will meet in a one-game play-off to decide the challenger. The bottom two players in each league lose their places.

New Kisei system favours status quo

We would like to amplify our description of the new Kisei system given in GW89 (and correct a mistake).

One of the key features of the Kisei leagues is that there is no play-off in case of a tie: victory goes to the higher-ranked player. For the initial league, the official rankings before the league started were adopted: title holders first (in order, from the Meijin down), former top-three title holders next [not all former title holders, as we mistakenly wrote in GW89, page 52, right-hand column, second paragraph], then in order of dan rank (players of the same dan are ranked in order of seniority). This is the order in which the players are listed in the *Kido Yearbook*. Yoda Norimoto, for example, was ranked number 47 at the Tokyo branch of the Nihon Ki-in until his victory in the Meijin title match, because he is one of the more junior 9-dans (promoted in 1993).

One result is that the league system favours the status quo, that is, it works in favour of the players already at the top. Moreover, only the bottom two players drop out of each league, so there won't be much turnover. We are not yet convinced that the new Kisei system is an improvement on the old one.

Cho Chikun makes good start in Oza challenge

Having lost all the titles in his triple crown, Cho Chikun may be taking more interest than usual in the minor titles. Usually he does not do so well in one-day games (his ratio of big-three titles, which have two-day games, to other titles is far higher than any other professional), but he has won the right to a return match with O Rissei in the 48th Oza title. The play-off to decide the chal-

lenger was held on 28 August; playing black, Cho defeated Yoda Norimoto, forcing him to resign after 187 moves. (At the time, that looked like a good omen for his Meijin defence.)

The title match began on 23 October, and Cho made a good start. Playing white, he forced O Rissei to resign. Perhaps he will be able to take revenge for his Kisei loss.

Ryu to challenge for Tengen

In the play-off to decide the challenger for the 26th Tengen title, held on 21 September, Ryu Shikun 7-dan (B) defeated Cho Sonjin 9-dan by 5½ points. The title holder is Kobayashi Koichi.

Ryu made his tournament debut in the 20th Tengen in 1994, winning the fourth and final game of the title match against Rin Kaiho on his 23rd birthday. The following year he rebuffed the challenge of Kobayashi Koichi 3-2 (incidentally, he had also beaten Kobayashi in the play-off to decide the challenger the previous year); next, he won a return match with Rin 3-2 in 1996. In the same year he took the Oza title from O Rissei 3-0, so he was a double title holder, though he lost a Honinbo challenge to Cho Chikun 4-2. Since then, Ryu has always maintained his position as one of the top players, being a regular member of the Honinbo and Meijin leagues and doing well in the first Kisei league. This is his chance to show that he's still got what it takes.

Michael Redmond makes 9-dan, Hans Pietsch 4-dan

Michael Redmond has capped his trail-blazing career at the Nihon Ki-in by winning promotion to 9-dan after 19½ years as a professional. Michael earned the points for promotion by winning a game played on 27 September. Michael went from 8-dan to 9-dan in the relatively quick time of four years.

Hans Pietsch of Germany is also making excellent progress in his career at the Nihon Ki-in. He won promotion to 4-dan in a game played on 27 October. Hans became a professional in 1997, so he has gone to 4-dan in three and a half years.

Aoki Kikuyo wins Women's Kakusei, reaches 8-dan

Aoki Kikuyo 7-dan, holder of the Women's Meijin title and probably the top woman player in Japan on current form, won the 22nd Women's Kakusei, defeating Osawa Narumi 2-dan in the final. This is Aoki's fourth Women's Kakusei title.

Following the above success, Aoki became the second Japanese woman to reach 8-dan. She earned the promotion points on 21 September. Aoki has been playing so well recently that she would seem to have a good chance of becoming the first Japanese woman 9-dan.

Challenger takes lead in Women's Honinbo

Inori Yoko 5-dan has made a good start in her challenge for a title. In the 19th Women's Honinbo, she has taken a 2-1 lead over the defending champion, Chinen Kaori, who has held this title three years in a row.

Results to date:

Game 1 (11 October). Inori (B) by resig.

Game 2 (18 October). Chinen (B) by resig.

Game 3 (25 Oct.). Inori (B) by 7½.

Cho Sonjin wins 7th Kiriya Cup

The final of the 7th Kiriya Cup (actually the second title under the new sponsor — for the first five years, it was the Acom Cup) was held in Kyoto at the headquarters of the sponsor, the Agon sect of Buddhism, on 8 October. It featured the same pairing as last year's Honinbo title match and the result was the same: a victory for Cho Sonjin over Cho Chikun. Playing black, Cho Sonjin forced Cho Chikun to resign after 161 moves.

This is Cho Sonjin's first title win since he won the Honinbo title. It is also his first Acom/Kiriya title and his fourth title overall.

56th Honinbo League starts

The immediate past Honinbo has made a good start in the new Honinbo league, but not so his predecessor.

Three players retained their places from the 55th league: Cho Chikun, Yamada Kimio, and Otake Hideo. They were joined

by ex-Honinbo Cho Sonjin and four newcomers: Yuki Satoshi, Oya Koichi, Hane Naoki, and Cho U. The last three of these were making their league debut.

To date, only one round has been played, with the following results:

Yuki beat Cho Chikun, Otake b. Hane Naoki, Cho Sonjin b. Oya, and Cho U beat Yamda.

Kansai Ki-in celebrates 50th anniversary

A lavish party attended by 550 guests was held in Osaka on 1 September to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Kansai Ki-in (the exact date was 2 September 1950). It was attended by all 120 professional members.

The Kansai Ki-in started as a secession from the Nihon Ki-in and its early history was marked by hostility between the two bodies, but that has long been supplanted by a spirit of friendship and cooperation. One of the guests of honour was the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in, Imanaka Akio, attending in the place of the Chairman, Toshimitsu Matsuo, who had to attend the Honinbo inauguration party, held in Tokyo on the same day. In July Mr. Toshimitsu had paid a courtesy call on the Kansai Ki-in, the first-ever such visit. Recently the Kansai Ki-in and the Osaka branch of the Nihon Ki-in have been holding joint training sessions for inseis and cooperating in other ways. On the occasion of his visit, Mr. Toshimitsu pledged to cooperate further with the Kansai Ki-in in popularizing go and in raising the level of professional go to make Japan more competitive in the international arena.

The highlight of the party was a talk by Go Seigen, who reminisced about episodes from go history and the role played by the Kansai Ki-in's founder, the late Hashimoto Uтарo, who was a fellow disciple of Segoe Kensaku.

33-move game: second shortest ever

A game in the Gosei preliminary round ended after just 33 moves when one of the players hallucinated. It was played on 19 October and the unfortunate player was

Continued on page 27

The World Her Stage

The Rui Naiwei Story

by Akiyama Kenji

As readers of this magazine know, the big story at the beginning of this year was Rui Naiwei's triumph in winning one of the top professional titles in Korea. After a 'lost decade' in the 90s, when she was exiled to the outer fringes of the professional go world, Rui has finally found a new home in which her remarkable go talent can blossom once again. Her success not only in winning the Kuksu title but also in posting the best winning percentage in Korea in 1999 shows what a loss to the go world her missing decade was.

There are a number of mysteries in the Rui story. In an attempt to clarify these, Akiyama Kenji interviewed Rui and Jiang (direct quotes are from this interview) when they visited Japan for the 13th Fujitsu Cup. Unfortunately, he was not able to draw Rui out on the sensitive issues, but the account he wrote of her life in the last decade is still of interest. Below we present a slightly condensed translation.



Rui Naiwei

Capsule biography

Born in Shanghai on 28 December 1963. In 1982 she won all seven games as a member of the Chinese touring team in the Japan-China Go Exchange. In 1988 she became the world's first woman 9-dan (even now, there is only one other, Feng Yun, also of China). In 1990 she left China and came to live in Japan. In 1992 she reached the semifinals of the 2nd Ing Cup. In 1995 she won the 1st Bohai Cup: World Women's Go Championship and also won the 3rd and 4th Cups. In 1996 she went to live in the US. In March 1999 she and her husband, Jiang Zhujiu, became guest professionals at the Hanguk Kiwon (Korean Go Association). In February 2000 she defeated Cho Hun-hyun 2-1 in the 43rd Kuksu title match (see GW89) to become the first woman player ever to win a title open to all male and female professionals in an Asian country. She had beaten Yoo Chang-hyuk in a Kuksu preliminary game and Lee Chang-ho in the play-off (given in GW88), so in winning this title she triumphed over three of the world's top players (Korean fans would simply say 'the world's top three players').

The happiness of being able to play go

On 21 February this year there was a hubbub not only in the Korean go world but, to exaggerate a little, throughout the whole country. The Kuksu, the title with the longest tradition, had been won by a woman. Rui Naiwei had become the first woman ever to win an open professional go title.

When Rui visited Japan for the Fujitsu Cup (her first appearance), I asked her about her reaction at the time. She answered: 'It was like a dream. I couldn't believe I'd really won. Even now it's inexplicable to me how I won.' Then she added, 'This is the happiest time of my life. All I have to do is think about go.'

'The happiest time' — hidden behind these words is a long period of trial and tribulation.



Rui and Jiang at the Fujitsu Cup
Opening Ceremony (Tokyo, 7 April 2000)

Why Rui left China

In 1990, Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan and Rui, who was then 26, suddenly left China. Their reason for doing so was a mystery. People conjectured that there might have been a connection with the Tiananmen Incident of the previous year and the subsequent political clampdown. After all, many liberal young people did flee overseas at the time.

Rui: 'I don't want to talk about the past.'

Jiang: 'It had nothing to do with the Tiananmen Incident or political problems. I had bad relations with someone in the Chinese Weiqi Association [CWA]. This person was nasty to me — for example, he wouldn't let me be chosen as an international representative . . . It was the same for Rui.'

It seems that the problem was just one senior person in the Chinese Weiqi Association. Chen Zude, the president, and almost all the players were friendly to Jiang and Rui, but that was no help when a very influential person had taken such a dislike to them.

Jiang went to the US on 20 August 1990; Rui went to Japan on 5 September. They

were hoping to make a new start away from China. Although they had pledged to spend their lives together, they had to separate because Rui couldn't get an American visa.

A life of trials in Japan

As a friend of Rui's, I know how hard her life was in Japan. She had hoped to play go here, but she was not accepted. Most of the professionals I spoke to were negative, saying that it might be bad for relations with China or that she might take away all the prize money. Some were even less understanding, asking why they should have to play with someone who had come here from China just to have a good time. Only a few welcomed the idea, on the grounds that playing with her would raise their own level.

Rui: 'Not being able to play go when I wanted to so much was painful. . . . The only good thing was that it was a good environment for studying.'

The only opportunities Rui had for playing were special games organized by the magazines *Igo Club* and *Igo* and at Fujisawa Shuko's study camps. Also, there was a *ni-jubango* (20-game match) with Chinen Kaori organized by a private sponsor. I think that Chinen owes her present strength to this experience, but Rui also says that she learnt a lot from the series. [Rui won 19–1.]

However, Rui had no chance to play official games and she was living a life of despair. Added to that was her loneliness at being separated from Jiang.

In 1992 there was some good news for Rui: she and Jiang were invited to play in the 2nd Ing Cup. However, there were unexpected complications.

Playing in the Ing Cup

After a blank of two years, Rui and Jiang finally had a chance to play again, but a quarrel that broke out between the tournament sponsors and the Chinese Weiqi Association threatened to spoil it all.

The cause of the dispute was three conditions set by the CWA on its participation: firstly, that Rui not be invited; secondly, that the first three rounds be held in Shanghai, with the CWA acting as joint sponsor;

thirdly, that Jiang not participate.

Mr. Ing maintained that as the sponsor he had the right to invite whomever he pleased. Those invited had the right to accept or decline, as they wished, but not the right to attach conditions to their entry.

After negotiation, the Chinese were moving towards compromise on the first issue, but not on the other two.

Jiang: 'Apparently, the CWA insisted that they couldn't recognize me because of a political problem. I was clearly told that later by that person.'

One of the rules of the Ing Cup is that the top eight place-getters are personally seeded into the next cup. Jiang was a quarterfinalist in the 1st Cup, so clearly he had a right to play. The Chinese objection was unreasonable, but they went ahead and boycotted the tournament. One can't help thinking that the Tiananmen Incident had something to do with it.

The first three rounds were held in Tokyo on 13, 15, and 17 July 1992. At the Opening Party, Rui and Jiang revealed that they had just got married.

As the first woman to play in a world go championship, Rui monopolized the spotlight in Tokyo. In the first round, she convincingly defeated Komatsu Hideki, who commented: 'Calling Rui the world's strongest woman player is funny. Shouldn't it just be the world's strongest player?'

In the second round, Rui outfought the 16-year-old Lee Chang-ho, who was already a world champion, having won the Tong Yang Securities Cup. [The Komatsu and Lee games are given in GW69.] In Round 3, she easily disposed of Yang Jae-ho of Korea, who had beaten her husband in Round 2. She thus qualified for the semifinals.

Mr. Ing was delighted with all the publicity Rui secured for his tournament. 'This proves we weren't mistaken in inviting her,' he said. 'I couldn't be happier.'

The semifinals were held four months later in Taipei. Rui's opponent was Otake. After one win each, the third game was very hard fought. Rui made a misplay, so victory went to Otake. In the interview after the game, Rui simply said: 'There are no more games for me.' She then broke down and

cried. [These three games are given in GW69.]

Days of suffering

After the semifinals finished, Jiang, who had come to Taipei to see the games, went back to the US and Rui returned to Japan. The next year was the most painful for Rui, but in December 1993 Jiang moved to Japan, so the two were finally able to live together.

One or two newspapers sounded out the Nihon Ki-in about Rui's playing in the tournaments they sponsored, but the answer was 'no'. One newspaper that wrote a prominent article about Rui was asked by the Nihon Ki-in why the paper gave more space to Rui than to reporting on title matches.

Apart from not playing in tournaments, the life led by the two was in no way different from other professionals. On Thursdays they would go to the Nihon Ki-in to spectate at games; on other days they would take part in study groups or teach amateurs. Rui officially became a disciple of Go Seigen and joined his study group.

There were individuals who attempted to help Rui. The writer Ezaki Masanori got together a group of his go-playing friends and hired Rui and Jiang as teachers. At one point, they were taking daily lessons, which was a great help to the two financially and also gave them moral support. There were also well-disposed professionals who invited them to various go events and go meetings.

Rui was very grateful for this help, but she also became more and more anxious about her go career. 'I began to think that I'd never be able to become a professional again. I was full of despair.'

In October 1996 the two finally gave up on Japan. They moved to the US, taking up residence in a suburb of San Francisco.

[In April 1996, both Rui and Jiang played in the 3rd Ing Cup, although the opening rounds were held in Shanghai. Presumably the Chinese Weiqi Association chose not to object to their participation, but we don't have any information on this. Jiang beat Chou (Zhou) of Chinese Taipei in the first round, but lost to Cho Chikun in the second. Rui was seeded into the second round, but lost to Lee Chang-ho. *Tr.*]



A life devoted to go

Life in America

In July 1996, Jimmy Cha and other professionals living in North America founded the APGPA or American Professional Go Players Association. There were nearly a dozen professionals living in the US and Canada, and the APGPA was the first step in organizing professional go on a systematic basis. The previous year, a professional tournament, the North American Masters, had been founded (see box).

North American Masters Championship

1st (1995). Jiang Zhujiu b. Jimmy Cha 2-1.
2nd (1996). Jiang b. Rui 2-1.
3rd (1997). Jiang b. Michael Redmond 2-0.
4th (1998). Jiang b. Jimmy Cha 2-0.
5th (1999). Jiang b. Rui 2-1.
6th (2000). Jiang b. Rui 2-1.

Also, a five-player team knockout match with Taiwan was organized on the Net; it ended in a one-sided victory for the US. The members of the US team were Jimmy Cha (captain), Jiang, Michael Redmond, Yang Yilun, and Rui.

Rui was able to play in the Samsung Cup and the Bohai Cup women's championship. She and Jiang also spent a lot of time teaching go on the West Coast.

Rui: 'In America I had plenty of time to take it easy, but I couldn't relax because I was so far from a good go-playing environment.'

This is where Jimmy Cha comes in. He had long been good friends with Jiang and he resolved to do something to help them. In fact, he became their saviour. Apparently his efforts started as far back as 1994, when he wrote a letter on their behalf to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Hanguk Kiwon and started talking to other Korean professionals.

The initial reaction was mixed; most people were worried about the reaction of the Chinese Weiqi Association. Over the years, however, Cha kept working on their behalf whenever he had a chance. His most telling argument with other professionals was the question: 'How would you feel if you were told not to play competitively, just to teach?'

In the meantime, there was a change in attitude at the CWA. Jiang attributes this to the efforts of Chen Zude. It became apparent that the CWA wouldn't object to their joining the Hanguk Kiwon.

Some Korean professionals had the same worries as the Japanese: if Rui did well, their own income would diminish. However, Cho Hun-hyun, who is more or less a leader of Korean professionals, was more open-minded. He argued: 'If we accept the two and they're weak, our earnings won't be affected. If they're really strong, everyone will learn from them.'

Cho's support was decisive. Other top professionals like Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk were also in favour of accepting them. At a general meeting of Korean professionals, the vote was 46-15, a majority of over three quarters. Rui and Jiang were made guest members of the Hanguk Kiwon, with the right to participate in all professional tournaments. This decision, which is such a contrast to the way they were given the brush-off in Japan, perhaps testifies to the energy and self-confidence and youthfulness of the Korean go world.

Even if I lose, there's the next game

After securing working visas, the two arrived in Korea on 9 April 1999. They barely had time to unpack before they were playing their first games. Rui won her first game, in a women's tournament, but lost her second, in the LG Cup preliminary tournament, to Choi Myung-hun. Jiang made a similar start.

Jimmy Cha had been pessimistic about the effect their long absence from tournament go would have. Cha: 'I thought things wouldn't go well at first. I expected it to take two years for them to recover their real strength.'

Rui: 'I thought the same. I was even afraid that I might not be able to recover my former strength. However, even if I lost, I could play more games, so this took the pressure off me.'

This gave her a composure that made all the difference. Rui got back into form immediately. She started off by taking a women's title, then moved into top gear during summer and autumn, winning her

way through the preliminaries of a number of tournaments.

In her last game of 1999, Rui defeated Mok Jin-seuk, one of the top young players at the Hanguk Kiwon [he came third in the 13th Fujitsu Cup] in the final game of the Chunweon [= Tengen] preliminary tournament. That gave her the best winning percentage for 1999 of all Korean pros. Her record was 33* wins to 6 losses, an 84.6% winning record. Who would have imagined that she would do so well in her first year?

Rui's good form continued in the new year. When she defeated Lee Chang-ho in the play-off to decide the Kuksu challenger [the game is given in GW88], she attracted the attention of the Korean mass media.

Rui: 'I gave a lot of interviews, and the media made a big fuss about me. However, I know hardly any Korean, so this didn't distract me.'

Rui must have been under a lot of pressure in the title match, but at the same time she must have felt that her dreams were finally coming true. She lost the first game to Cho Hun-hyun, but then won two in a row to take the title [see GW89]. This is surely a significant achievement not just for women go players but also for women in general.

The happiest time of my life

Rui: 'Cho Hun-hyun has been very kind to me, reviewing my games, treating me to meals and so on.' Actually, there's a connection: Rui is a disciple of Go Seigen and Cho was the last disciple of Segoe Kensaku, who was Go's teacher. Since Rui and Cho both speak Japanese, it's also easy for them to communicate.

As it turned out, Rui won her first title from Cho. Rui: 'It was like a dream. I was lucky. I played above my usual level and Cho was in bad form. That's why I won.'

The public reaction was very favourable. There were hardly any go fans who were upset because a Korean had lost to a foreigner; instead, everyone was full of praise for this remarkable achievement by a

* In GW88, page 54, her record is given as 34-6 (source: *Go Weekly*). We can't explain the discrepancy.

woman. Immediately there was an inquiry from the President's office. President Kim Dae-chung was away on an overseas visit, but his wife sent a congratulatory telegram on his behalf.

The three 'Rui effects'

Rui's activity is having three effects in the Korean go world. One is to raise the level of women's go, which, relatively speaking, had not been well developed. Stimulated by Rui's success, women's go is now making rapid advances. Particularly worthy of note are the 15-year-old Cho Hye-yeon and the 16-year-old Park Ji-un. Cho did very well in the final of the 1st Hung Chang Cup, held at about the same time as the Kukso title match. She lost the best-of-three final, but she won a game and her play was said to be virtually on the same level as Rui's. Park is a very promising player; at present she holds the Women's Myung-in (= Meijin) title.

Jiang: 'In about three years' time, Rui may no longer be able to beat them.' Rui nodded in agreement as he said this. Korean women players may be a real threat in the future.

The second 'Rui effect' is that new sponsors have appeared, attracted by the publicity that Rui has generated. This may lead to the birth of new tournaments. Korean go will thrive all the more.

The third 'Rui effect' is just a conjecture by this writer. I think that Korean go may change because of her. The most common type of player, represented by Cho, is the 'early lead, coast to a win' type. Rui always challenges the opponent to a fight and she's been successful. Korean players will have to devise countermeasures, so Korean go may change.

A life devoted to go

Let's take a look at Rui's daily life in Korea.

Unlike Japan, playing days are not set [in Japan, low-ranked players play on Wednesdays, high-ranked players on Thursdays]. Tournament preliminaries are often held in short, concentrated spells, so games may be held every day or every second day.

Even when they don't have games, Rui and Jiang show their faces at the Hanguk

Kiwon every day. There are many enthusiastic young players, so impromptu study sessions are held. These last until around six p.m. If there's a title game, everyone stays till it ends, which is usually around nine p.m.

Every Saturday, the Chung-am study group, to which most of the young players belong, holds sessions. Members play a fast game in the morning and one in the afternoon. On Sundays, Rui and Jiang sometimes play tennis or go hiking, but quite often they end up in front of the go board.

I tried a personal question — 'How are things financially?' — but I was parried. 'Apart from meals and rent, we have no expenses, so there are no problems.'

Rui: 'This is the happiest time of my life. I can live thinking just of go. There's nothing else I want.'

I interviewed Rui just after she'd lost her game in the second round of the Fujitsu Cup. Even so, she could say it was the happiest time of her life. You can imagine her joy at finally finding a home in Korea after her long exile from the professional go arena. (*Go Weekly*, 24 April~22 May 2000. Translated by John Power.)

Below we would like to present two of Rui's games against Lee Chang-ho. The game in which she became Kukso challenger by defeating Lee was given in GW88; since then she has played two more games against him and won both of them. Her total record against Lee to date is 4-1, so she is replacing Yoda Norimoto as his nemesis (Yoda is not the only other player with a plus record against Lee, but he has been playing him for longer than the others, for example, Zhou Heyang; however, most of Yoda's wins came a decade or so ago; in the last couple of years, Lee actually has a plus record against him.)

Rui vs. Lee KBS invitational game

The first game is a special game staged by KBS, the nationally-run TV channel, just two weeks after Rui had won the Kukso title.

White: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Black: Rui Naiwei 9-dan

Komi: 6½ points. Time: 50 minutes each + 40-second byo-yomi.

Played on 3 March 2000.

Commentary by Mok Jin-seuk 5-dan.





Figure 1 (1-25)



Dia. 1: Kuksu title match, game 2

Figure 1 (1-25). Rui's aggressive style

The opening to 9 is the same as in the second game of the Kuksu title match between Rui and Cho Hun-hyun (given in GW89). In that game, Cho had played 10 as in Dia. 1, and the game continued as shown to 28. However, the Chung-am group (a study group of top young professionals)

concluded that this development is favourable for Black. Black has territory while White has thickness, but this thickness is flawed by the weak point at 'a'. White would like to defend at 'b', but this is too slow.

Black 21 and 23 are natural. With 25, we start to feel Rui's power. Black A is better for taking territory, but it leaves a weak point at B.





Figure 2 (26-46)




Dia. 2: bad for White

Figure 2 (26-46). The natural move is wrong.


Black 27. Black 40 is out of the question, as A or 36 would be too good for White. If Black plays the loose pincer at 36, White can switch to 40, but in the game he can't do so. The aggressive move of 27 is typical of Rui's

style.

White 28. If White jumps to 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black gets the good contact play of 4, leaving the marked white stone looking lonely and the group at the top unsettled.



Dia. 3: bad for Black



Dia. 4: bad for Black


Black 29. This is a difficult point. Fighting spirit calls for the hane at A, but Black can't get a good result. See *Dia. 3*. White counters with 2 to 6; the ladder after 7 is bad for Black, so this result is unfavourable. Switching 3 to 3 in *Dia. 4* doesn't help: White 10 makes *miai* of 'a' and 'b'. The conclusion is that the hane is no good.

That being the case, the moves to 31 are a natural flow.


White 32. Lee rejected the simple moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*: 4 is too good for Black. If

so, White could try switching 3 to 3 in *Dia. 6*, but Lee considered this also good for Black.

That means that the moves to 37 are also the natural flow. However, White's next move is dubious.



Dia. 5: rejected by Lee



Dia. 6: also good for Black

Almost any player would block at 38 without thinking: it's the instinctive move. However, White gets a bad result in the continuation, and backtracking makes it clear that 38 is the culprit. The two-step hane of 39 and 41 is very effective: it puts White on the spot. He has to play at 42, but then he suffers a severe blow from the peep at 43. Having to connect at 46 is painful.

How should White have played instead of 38?







Figure 3 (38-67)
(38-46 repeated)




Dia. 7: best for White




Dia. 8: White is satisfied



Dia. 9: good enough for White



Dia. 10: White's group is frail



Dia. 11: Black's threat

Figure 3 (38-67). Rui seizes the initiative.

The best move for 38 is White 1 in Dia. 7. Even if the sequence continues as in the game after 3, getting in the extension at 1 in sente makes a big difference. If Black decides to answer 1 at 2 in Dia. 8, blocking at White 6 will be a little heavy, but White has a good alternative: dodging to 3. He can be satisfied with the result to 7. Therefore, Black will attack with 2 in Dia. 9, but White can get a *sabaki* shape up to 7.

White 46 may look submissive and lacking in ingenuity, but White gets a worse result if he plays at 1 in Dia. 10. After 10, Black threatens to attack at 'a' or 'b', so White is unhappy.

Black 53 and 55 feel good; that's why missing Dia. 7 was bad.

White 56 is necessary. If Black gets thick in the centre, she can kill White with the sequence shown in Dia. 11. Since a reinforcement is going to be necessary sooner or later, White makes it now. Moreover, 56 aims at White A. This move is typical of Lee.

White 66 is also necessary: permitting Black B would be too painful.

In this figure, Black has clearly seized the initiative.





Figure 4 (68-100)




Dia. 12: Cho's suggestion

Figure 4 (68-100). Lee's brilliancy


White 68. Cho Hun-hyun, the TV commentator, recommended following Dia. 12. If Black plays 4 at 'a', White will omit 5 and go directly to 7. White 68 is the Lee Chang-ho style, however: he prefers it, because his group lives 100%, which is not so in Dia. 12. If this diagram illustrates Cho's fast-paced style, the slow-but-sure move of White 68 is typical of Lee.

White 74. It's safe to say that no one could have predicted this move. One's first instinct is to play at A at the top. Especially if they were behind, most players would play there. Yet Lee chose to play 74 and 76. The reason is his positional judgement:

White A is, of course, big, but if Black is allowed to play at B or C, White has no chance of catching up. Capturing a stone alleviates the threat of those two moves.



Dia. 13: a sure win for Black



Dia. 14: Lee's brilliancy

Black 77 is Rui's first and only slack move of the game. This is Black's chance to force with 1 in Dia. 13. After Black 3 next, White 4 is necessary to secure two eyes. Black could then switch to 5; if White invaded at 'a', Black could answer at 'b' and kill him.

Because of this slack move, White starts to catch up.

White 82 is an exquisite move: probably only a genius like Lee Chang-ho could come up with it. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 14, White can later invade at 2; thanks to the marked stone, he gets a ko. If Black tries to eliminate this aji by answering 82 at D, White will descend at E in sente; that secures two eyes, so White will be able to dispense with the move at 4 in Dia. 13. In other words, he would save a move, which is significant.

There's a go proverb, 'when you don't know what to do, switch elsewhere'. That's just what Rui does with 83.

White 86. White can't play at F: Black G, White H, Black I. However, White 86 forces Black 87, as White J would be painful.

Up to 90, White has caught up quite a lot. However, Black is still a little ahead.




Figure 5 (101-130)






Figure 6 (131-161)

57: ko (below 44); 60: ko (at 44)



Dia. 15: safety-first loses



Dia. 16: Black wins

Figure 5 (101-130). White's challenge

Black 5. This invasion makes good use of Black's thickness. White 6 is the fighting answer.

White 12 helps secure eye shape, so White is satisfied. For her part, Black is satisfied with taking profit with 25.

Incidentally, the latter part of this game was all played in byo-yomi: Black from 79, White from 86.

White 30. Usually you would expect White to play 30 at 1 or 'a' in *Dia. 15* to look after this group. However, Black continues with 2 to 10 and wins by ten points on the board. White 30 is a do-or-die move.

Figure 6 (131-161). Lee goes out fighting.

White 32 is another do-or-die move. If White jumped to 1 in *Dia. 16*, Black would force with 2 to 8 as before, then play 10 and 12 in sente. This is also a win for Black, by eight or nine points on the board, according to Lee.

Black 33. Black is now seriously interested in capturing something.


White 46 should be at 48, but Black plays at 49 and has a 'flower-viewing ko' at 39 for the life of the white group. White 46 is a do-or-die move.

White 52 is also a do-or-die move. The


correct move is 1 in *Dia. 17*, but after 8 Black again has a flower-viewing ko at 'a'.

With 57, Black switches from the flower-viewing ko to the other ko.

White resigns after Black 61, as he has no ko threats. After the game someone asked Lee about saving his group with 1 in *Dia. 18*. His answer was that Black wins by much more than ten points on the board. White's capture of four stones at the top is actually bigger than Black's capture on the side — the truly painful thing for White is that Black 2 is sente, because the Black F-I threat shown in Figure 4 has come alive again. Black 4 is also sente.



Dia. 17: a flower-viewing ko



Dia. 18: unwinnable for White

This game seems to have been lost for White after his slack move at 38 in Figure 2. Despite the short time allowance, Rui played only one slack move, and that didn't actually give up the lead.

All in all, this was an excellent win for Rui against the world's number one player. Lee really does seem to find her aggressive style hard to handle.

To see Rui do it again, have a look at the next game.

White resigns after Black 161.

(*Paduk*, April 2000. Translation dictated by Seo Jung-moon, who was an insei at the same time as Lee Chang-ho and is now a student at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, and written up by John Power.)

Rui vs. Lee 5th LG Oil Refinery Cup

White: Rui Naiwei

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Komi: 6½

Played on 8 September 2000.

Commentator not specified.




Figure 1 (1-15)

Figure 1 (1-15). White's skilful fuseki


The moves to 7 are a currently fashionable opening. White 8 and 10 are a special strategy: they hold in check Black's potential in this area. These two stones are a factor in White's eventual win.

Dia. 1 (next page) shows one possible follow-up that uses the marked stones.


Black 13. The usual move is to wedge in at 1 in *Dia. 2 (next page)*, as this creates bad aji for White at 'a' and 'b'. However, Black is not happy at being confined to a low position at the top. White's play makes use of the

two marked stones. This is not interesting for Black. Switching to 13 shows flexibility.

Black 15 is meant to discourage White from putting *Dia. 1* into effect. There's no point in playing 1 to 5 there if Black has a stone lying in wait further down the side.



Dia. 1: White's follow-up



Dia. 2: good for White




Figure 2 (16-31)

Figure 2 (16-31). Black's good start

White 22 is the strongest move. Lee wants to play a territorial game, but Rui insists on fighting.

Black 29 is big and also sets up the sharp invasion of 31. The game seems to be going well for Black. But Rui's next move astonished everyone.






Figure 3 (32-60)




Note that Black 39 is the simplest move. One's first instinct would be to play at 1 in *Dia. 3*, but, after the continuation to 10 'a' and 'b' are miai for White, as the ladder from 'c' doesn't work. This result would be a tragedy for Black.

If Black extends the other way, at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White plays the familiar tesuji combination of 2 and 4 and gets a good result up to 8.




Dia. 4: good for White



Dia. 5: good for Black

White 42 is correct. White 1 in *Dia. 5* is an overplay: Black will extend at 2. White then pushes through and cuts, but, thanks to the marked stone (33 in the figure), Black can counter with 8 and 10, securing a favourable result.


When White plays 48, Black is faced with a dilemma: either attack on a large scale with Black B or go for a large corner with 49. Either strategy looks inviting. Conscious he was ahead, Lee went for the smaller-scale move of 49, but, judging by the result, this was not good. Professionals following the game preferred attacking with B. In struggling to live, White will have to help Black build thickness, which will adversely affect White's left-side position. Moreover, Black has a flower-viewing ko in the bottom right corner, shown in *Dia. 6*.



Dia. 6: ko

Black 53 is a surprisingly strong move. If Black simply hanes at 55, White plays 56 and

fights a ko. In retrospect, however, playing 53 at 55 or C would have been good enough to keep the lead.



Dia. 7: dead

White 54. If on the other side, at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black kills the group with a *gomoku-nakade* up to 16.




Figure 4 (61-81)

Figure 4 (61-81). Not a success for Black

The moves from 63 to 73 are a magnificent sequence: Black lives, White escapes with both thickness and sente. Locally, his play has been good, but overall the result is a failure for Black. That's why Black 49 was queried.

The peep of White 74 is a mistake: it provokes 75, which builds thickness. In view of that, White 80 becomes necessary, which costs White her chance to defend at 81 at the top.

Black 81 is correct. Before turning the page, can you work out why he doesn't wedge in one space below?






Figure 5 (81-100)
(81 repeated)



Dia. 8: Black is happy




Dia. 9: not happy any more

Figure 5 (81-100). Lee's originality

Black 81. Black would prefer to be able to wedge in at 82. If White answered as in Dia. 8, Black would get a satisfactory result in the

corner and also have the aji of the cutting point at 'a' to look forward to. However, instead of playing this way —

Dia. 9. White will counter with 2 and 4. When Black sets up a ladder with 5, White has an excellent ladder block at 6.



Dia. 10: White is satisfied

Black 83 is a good, practical move. Dia. 10 shows the usual joseki. Lee doesn't like this because White gets thickness. In the game, White doesn't get to block at A (4 in the diagram) in sente, so that remains as a weak point for Black to exploit. Lee does his own thinking, instead of relying on received wisdom.

White 88 to 92 are meant as light forcing moves, one aim of which is to cover White's weakness at A.

Black 93. Black plays here instead of capturing because he wants to emphasize the aji of A, but he is a little too preoccupied with this point. Black 93 gives White the excellent move of 96.

White seems to have stirred up some trouble in Black's corner.

Figure 6 (101-150). Not his usual self

Black 1 is well timed. If White connects at 3, the group can't live, so resisting with 2 is correct. However, Black overdoes things by starting the ko immediately with 3. This is not the ko he should be fighting.

Rui seems to throw Lee off his stride: perhaps he lacks confidence against her. At any rate, he has played some uncharacteristic moves in this game, first at 53 in Figure 3 and here with 3.

Because of Black 3, a large ko follows in which the burden is heavier on Black than on White. Moreover, White has more ko



threats: Black is on the spot. Instead of 3, connecting at Black 4 was the only move; White connects at 3, and Black can then play the ko shown in *Dia. 11*. The burden of this ko on Black is much lighter.





Figure 6 (101–150)

ko: 9, 12, 15, 18, 21; 23: ko (at 1)

Black 13 and 19 are *son-ko* (ko threats that lose points).

Black ends the ko with 23, but White 24 costs him a lot more points, to add to his *son-ko*.



Dia. 11: a better ko for Black

White is ahead, but a lot of very difficult fighting follows in the upper left quarter of the board, showing how hard it is to wrap up a win.


Black 27 is a very strong do-or-die move: Black is preparing for a decisive aerial battle in this area. If White tries to capture everything, Black will be able to live inside. White therefore goes for safety-first with 28, then 30. Her conservative play gives Black a chance to catch up.

Black 31 is another do-or-die move: the biggest move on the board is actually Black 34, but Lee wants to forestall White A, as he believes that that would make the game hopeless for Black.


Black 35 is the strongest move, but Rui's 36 is the strongest answer. The first person to flinch will lose, so we see a spirited fighting exchange. Black tries to capture 36 with 37 and 39.

Black 49. Black is still going all-out. *Dia. 12* (next page) shows a possible compromise

strategy, but Lee had no confidence this would win.



Dia. 12: Black's compromise strategy



*Figure 7 (151-200)
94: captures (at 90)*


Figure 7 (151-200). A momentary upset

White 52 is a good forcing move (if Black ignores it, White kills him with 86, Black A, White B, Black 87, White 55), but 53 is well timed, so White's connection is not secure. After 56, the question of whether Black can cut with C will decide the game. This centre fight is extremely difficult, especially as the players are in byo-yomi.


Black 61 is a tremendous move: Lee's reading in byo-yomi is phenomenal. If White answers at 1 in *Dia. 13*, the instinctive move,

Black will force with 2 to 6, then cut at 8. White will be in bad trouble.

If Black tries to capture without first playing 61, that is, with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 14*, White counterattacks and saves her group up to 22. For that reason, Black wants to get a stone in place at 2 in *Dia. 13*.



Dia. 13: White's group in danger



Dia. 14: White's group comes back to life

Rui also read out these variations, but she failed to find the best counter to 61. White 62 is a bad move: she should defend at 63 [presumably, the idea is she then ignores Black 64]. Black gains with 65 and upsets White's lead.

Black's lead disappears in a flash when he plays 67 instead of blocking at 68. This is

the final losing move: another upset takes place with 68.

Black 67 shows that Lee is only human, whatever his opponents may think.

Figure 8 (201–236). A great fighting game

White 6 and Black 7 are miai. The game is very close, but White is definitely ahead.

Black 35. Lee is looking for a place to resign: he's $\frac{1}{2}$ or $1\frac{1}{2}$ points behind, and the gap can't be bridged.

This was a great fighting game, full of unpredictable play. What seems to give Rui her edge is her ability to induce Lee to make overplays. That is quite uncharacteristic of Lee, so perhaps it's an indication of mental pressure: he may feel that she is his nemesis. Who would have predicted when Rui joined the Hanguk Kiwon that she would score 3–0 against him in her first year (they were 1–1 in the Ing Cup prior to this)?

Black resigns after White 236.

(Paduk, October 2000. Translated by Seo Jung-moon and John Power.)




Figure 8 (201–236)

Go World News

Continued from page 9

Obuchi Morito 9-dan, who had to resign early to Ryu Shikun 7-dan. The shortest game that we know of in Japan lasted just 20 moves (it was played on 21 November 1996 in the 2nd preliminary round of the 53rd Honinbo tournament; Ono Nobuyuki 6-dan lost to Kudo Norio 9-dan); this game is a tie for second shortest with the Haruyama–Maeda game given in *The Go Player's Almanac* (page 159).

Retirement

Ando Takeo 6-dan, who is well-known to Western players for his role in the International Go Federation, retired from active play on 31 July. He was born on 11 September 1938, became a disciple of Ito Tomoe 7-dan, and made 1-dan in 1958. He was promoted to 6-dan in 1971. He served as a director of the Nihon Ki-in for many years and also has many disciples, including Yoda Norimoto and Cho Sonjin.

Kobayashi Satoru wins Haya-go Championship

The final of the 33rd Haya-go Championship (telecast on 15 & 22 October) featured a clash between two Kobayashis: Satoru and Koichi. The former was victorious, defeating Koichi by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points holding black. This was his first win in this title (Koichi has won it four times) and takes his tally of titles to nine.

Obituary: Koyama Shizuo

Koyama Shizuo 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in died of a lymphatic tumour on 5 September. Born on 27 April 1937, Koyama became a disciple of Sekiyama Riichi. He became 1-dan in 1951 and reached 9-dan in 1971. He twice took first place in the Kansai Ki-in rating tournament and won the Kansai Ki-in Number One Position title in 1962.

News from Korea

Lee Chang-ho defends Wangwi title

Lee Chang-ho has won the Wang-wi (King) title for the fifth year in a row. The match looked like becoming an interesting one when the challenger, Seo Bong-su 9-dan, won the second game (18 July) and tied the score, but Lee went on to win the third (24 July) and fourth (4 August) games to defend his title.

Rui wins Women's Kuksu title

Rui Naiwei won the open Kuksu (National Champion) title earlier this year, but she met with stiff opposition in a match that should, in theory, have been much easier for her, the Women's Kuksu. Rui won the first game (28 July) in this best-of-three match, playing white, but then the 15-year-old Cho Hye-yeon 2-dan won the second (3 August). However, Rui triumphed in the third (11 August), winning by resignation with black.

The score was the same as the Hung Chang Cup played between these two earlier this year. Though she lost, Cho's ability to score wins against Rui shows that she must already be one of the world's top women players.

Lee brothers vie for title

The two Lee brothers have won the A and B leagues in the New Stars Best Ten title and are competing in the match to decide the champion. Winner of the A league was Lee Sang-hun 3-dan; winner of the B league was his younger brother, Lee Se-dol 3-dan, who earlier this year had a winning streak of 32 games, the third-best in Korean go history.

This is the first time brothers have met in a title match. Two games have been played to date. Sang-hun won the first (6 October; W, by resig.) and Se-dol won the second (24 October; W, by resig.). The deciding game was played on 1 November.

Lee Se-dol has also reached the play-off to decide the Chunweon (= Tengen) challenger. He is really having a big year — see the next item.

Lee Se-dol challenging for Paedal title

Lee Se-dol 3-dan is challenging Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan for the 8th Paedal Wang title. However, he made a bad start in the best-of-five title match, losing the first game (20 October).

The 17-year-old Lee beat a 15-year-old, Pak Yeong-hun 2-dan, 2-1 in the best-of-three play-off to decide the challenger. Teenagers seem to be on the verge of taking over Korean go. In 1965, when the 23-year-old Rin Kaiho challenged him for the Meijin title, Sakata Eio said that a Meijin in his 20s was inconceivable. As it turned out, Rin took the title from him, but one can't help wondering what Sakata thinks of the teenagers who are now coming to the fore in world go.

Lee defends Myung-in title

The 31st Myung-in (= Meijin) league ended in a three-way tie among Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan, Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan and Choi Myung-hun 7-dan. The play-off was won by Cho. However, he was unable to make any headway against Lee Chang-ho in the title match, losing three straight.

News from China

22 new shodans in China

The 2000 rating and shodan-promotion tournaments were held in Shanxi Province from 11 to 25 July. 112 players participated in the rating tournament, a Swiss held over 12 rounds, but, although 42 players earned promotions, there were no new 8- or 9-dans. 264 players competed in the shodan-promotion tournament, of whom 22 qualified as professionals.

Shao Weigang to challenge for Mingren title

The best-of-three play-off to decide the challenger for the 13th Mingren (= Meijin) title was held in Beijing on 7-9 August. Shao Weigang 9-dan defeated Liu Jing 8-dan 2-0 and so earned the right to challenge Ma Xiaochun for the title.

Late news on page 34

The 34th Wangwi Title Match, Game Four

Lee Chang-ho vs. Seo Bong-su

White: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Black: Seo Bong-su 9-dan

Komi: 5.5 points; time: 4 hours each

Played in Seoul at the Korean Go Association on August 4, 2000.

Based on a commentary by Lee Chang-ho.




Figure 1 (1-37)


Figure 1 (1-37). Analyzed beforehand

In this best-of-five match Lee won the first and third games, so Seo was one game away from losing the match. Still, Seo's victory in the second game was quite convincing, so he couldn't be counted out.


The game began at ten in the morning and the players took almost no time in making the first nine moves. According the Internet commentator Kim Seung-jun 7-dan, White 10 was a new move, and, since Lee played it after only two minutes of thought, he must have analyzed it before the game. Lee was probably bored with the usual two-space extension that is so often played.

The thin three-space extension of White 10 seems to call for Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. Lee said that he would have answered with 2. The continuation to White 16 is one possibility. When Black defends at 17, White could pull out his stone on the right with 18. If White dislikes *Dia. 1*, he could draw back with 4, then play 6 in *Dia. 2*. White A instead of 4 is also possible, but the numerous variations are complicated. Lee himself hadn't reached a definite

conclusion, while Seo chose to be cautious with the simple Black 11. Thus troubles were avoided, as Lee defended with White 12.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Perhaps stimulated by Lee's new move at 10, Seo didn't play the joseki move at A; instead, he pushed on with 19. *Dia. 3* is now the usual continuation, but Lee didn't like the checking extension of Black 6. He wanted sente so he could play 26.



Dia. 3

Seo had set his mind on a territorial game when he invaded with 27, so it was only natural to reinforce the upper right corner with 37.





Figure 2 (38-63)

Figure 2 (38-63). Very complicated

With all the corners and sides staked out, Lee decided to invade the bottom right with 38, the only opening in Black's formation. Black 39 to 41 are a common sequence, but White 42 is an interesting move here.

There are a lot of people who say Lee's go is uneventful, but the number of professionals who come up with new variations and moves, such as White 10 in *Figure 1* and 42 in this figure, as regularly as Lee does is small. And, considering that most of the new josekis that have become known as 'Korean style' in recent years focus around Lee, one cannot but admire his creativity.




Dia. 4

Instead of White 42, the usual way to play is with 1 in *Dia. 4*. White lives quite easily, but Black

6 and 8 would damage White's formation on the left, making Black 10 a troublesome move. Lee was hoping that White 42 would enable him to live in the corner without spilling over to the left, but the unexpected pressing move Black 47 led to a completely different development.


For White to answer submissively at 49 instead of 48 is almost out of the question. White 48 shows fighting spirit — fighting spirit, however, often results in being badly beaten up. Therefore, before resisting with 48, Lee thought for 24 minutes, to confirm that the attachment of 52 would work. Now it was Seo's turn to meditate about the game.

After 50 minutes, Seo played Black 53. This move gave away points, but it went for thickness and let White live in the corner. That must have been a difficult decision for Seo, who up to now had been simply grabbing territory. Yet, Lee agreed that this was the best way for Black to play. Seo had analyzed *Dia. 5* as well, but White is able to live in the corner after 8. Moreover, Black's wall is potentially weak, so this will be a source of concern for him.



Dia. 5

White 56 is urgent, as moving out diagonally with Black A would be surprisingly severe. But Seo's sharp attack with 59 and 61 made Lee regret White 56. Not that White 56 was bad; it is only that he should have played it after exchanging White 59 for a black extension. Connecting at B with 62 is heavy, but, according to Lee, 62 is not very good either. The reason is that the skipping move of Black 63 is very good, putting White at a loss for an answer. Cho Hun-hyun and Yoo Chang-hyuk wondered if White 1 in *Dia. 6* would be the normal course to follow. After the game Lee agreed that White 1 in *Dia. 6* is better than White 62 in the figure, but the reasoning behind it is so complicated that it's difficult to understand.



Dia. 6





Figure 3 (64-100)

Figure 3 (64-100). Swirling like falling leaves

After White blocked with 64, Black played 65 and 67, moves which were praised in the press-room as having an excellent feel. Pressing first with a knight's move (65) and then drawing back (67) is a strange way of playing and it is rarely seen, but Black succeeded in flattening the White upper side while gaining thickness in the center with the sequence to 73.




Dia. 7

Lee admitted that the game became bad for him somewhere around here. The cause was White's failure to push once at 59 in *Figure 2*, but one must admire Seo's flawless follow-up.

Seo seemed to be on the verge of turning this game into a masterpiece, but then he ruined it with the overplays of 79 and 81. Seo probably wanted to follow his sharp play at the top with an equally strong maneuver at the bottom, yet matters were different there. Black's stones suddenly became heavy. Black 79 was bad and 81 was overdoing things, according to Lee. He said that Black should first exchange 1 for White 2 in *Dia. 7* in sente to create influence in the center, then invade with Black 3, robbing the white stones on the right of their base. This would secure Black's lead. After White counterattacked with 82, Black was left with a weak group that had a long escape route ahead, and his positions above and in the lower right were weakened.

Suddenly, all kinds of interesting possibilities opened up for White. But White 94 was a mistake. It should have been played at 1 in *Dia. 8*. When Black played 99, White's stones became thin. The lead was switching back and forth like leaves swirling in a light breeze. Lee commented that had he played as in *Dia. 8*, he could have watched Black's weak stones struggle to find safe ground.



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (101-140). Losing sente

While White gained a few points on the left with 4, Black became quite thick with 5 and 7. Lee thought for 15 minutes, but White 8 was inevitable. Black could now cut with 9. Black was on the verge of setting the pace again.





Figure 4 (101-140)


White had to live in gote with 14. It must have felt good to play Black 15, because suddenly the white group no longer has eye shape. It looks as if Black only has to work out a good attacking plan to decide the game. After thinking for 7 minutes Seo decided on Black 17, and Lee took a long time over White 18 and 20 for his defense (7 and 19 minutes respectively). But it probably would have been a clearer path to victory for Black to play 1 in *Dia. 9*, forcing White to live, then to invade at 3 on the right side. In the game, Black is attacking, but his own stones are not very strong.



Dia. 9

In answer to Black 29, trapping the two stones with White 30 looks straightforward, but surprisingly after the game Lee recommended just play-

ing at 40. This may be a bit bewildering at first, but Lee offered the following analysis: Black 39 is bad. When White connects at 40, Black becomes thin in the center, and it is difficult to play elsewhere. That's how sente and gote got exchanged, so White gets to play on the right before Black, which is where the game will be decided.



Dia. 10

Black 39 seemed natural, but it was the reason why White was able to take the lead once more. Instead, Black should have immediately invaded at 1 in *Dia. 10*. White lives by capturing two stones, but Black enlarges his upper right territory in sente and he is ahead. Moreover, as long as he is left with the capture of the marked stone, there is nothing to worry about in the center.





Figure 5 (141-176)

60, 66, 72: at the squared stone; 63, 69: at 57

Figure 5 (141–176). ‘Avoiding’ the right side

By playing 41 to 51, Black managed to make a reasonable amount of territory in the center, but to do this he had to sacrifice his stones at 41, 43, and 47, so his gain was not that big. Comparing the position after White 52 with *Dia. 10* makes the right side look like a million-dollar bill. That shows clearly that forcing White to play 40 (the triangled white stone) in *Figure 4*, which in turn prompted Black to take gote in the center, was bad. The Internet commentator Kim Seung-jun said that because White wins if he gets to play first on the right, Black had no choice but to leave the center thin and invade the right instead of 41.

But Seo kept avoiding the right side. It’s hard to understand how he could have overlooked its importance, especially since he had been in great form recently. Probably he was misjudging the position, believing he would win after solidifying the center and playing Black 55. But there was something he failed to notice: the sharp ko threat of 64, with the clever continuation of 70 that struck the center that he had thought to be invulnerable. This is another interesting point in this game.




Dia. 11


Lee said that 72, capturing the ko immediately after 70, could have become White’s losing move. He should capture only after exchanging 1 for Black 2 in *Dia. 11*.

Next, although it was the correct decision for Black to abandon the ko in order to play in the center, 73 should have been played at 1 in *Dia. 12*. That would have made the game so close it would have been impossible to predict the winner. Black 73 was the final losing move.


Later, Black had to suffer a white attachment at A in *Figure 5*, but if Black had played as in *Dia. 12*, the lower right black group could easily connect by playing A (in sente) and B in *Dia. 12*, as can be seen later. Throughout, the game was extremely close, and the lead kept changing with the slightest slip.



Dia. 12



counter of Black 2 in *Dia. 13*. He really wanted to play at A in *Figure 6*, but, due to the defect of A in *Dia. 13*, it looks like an overplay as White gets cut off after 20. On the other hand, the comments that he played 78 as he was ahead were not incorrect either. It also didn't affect the outcome that White wasted a ko threat with 88 (according to Kim 7-dan, White 88 at 90 would have been better).



Dia. 13

The forcing move of 96 decided the game. To make things worse, Black 101 was also a mistake made while in byo-yomi. After White 102, it became hard for Black to connect his groups, and the game more or less ended here.

Figure 7 (209–230).

The tesuji of Black 19 brought Black's group to life again, but it was not enough to compensate for the loss caused by White 22. Black's two stones at 19 and 23 are captured by White 28, so Seo Bong-su resigned after White 30.




Figure 7 (209–230)

By winning the Wangwi title five years in a row, Lee Chang-ho also earned the status of honorary Wangwi.

230 moves. Black resigns.

From *Baduk* September 2000. Translated by Franz-Josef Dickhut.

Late News

Cho Sonjin is Kisei challenger

The playoff to decide the challenger to O Rissei for the 25th Kisei title was held at the Nihon Ki-in on 2 November. Playing black, Cho Sonjin 9-dan defeated Awaji Shuzo 9-dan by resignation after 259 moves.

The first game of the title match will be played in Taipei on 12 & 13 January 2001.

Lee leads in Ing final

Lee Chang-ho has taken a commanding lead in the 4th Ing Cup and now needs just one more win to take this title, one of the few international titles he hasn't already won. In the first game (1 November), Lee defeated Chang Hao by seven points. In the second (3 November), he won by just one point. The above games were played in Chengdu.

The remaining games will be played in Shanghai in early December.

Rin regains place in Meijin league

Rin Kaiho 9-dan already holds the record for most appearances in the Meijin league at 35 (including terms as title holder), but he is now set to extend his lead. In a play-off held on 2 November, Rin defeated Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan to make a comeback in the 26th league.

Yoda wins Judan Winners' section

Yoda Norimoto's good form is continuing. In the final game in the Winners' section of the 38th Judan tournament, played on 2 November, he defeated Takemiya Masaki 9-dan. Yoda will meet the winner of the Losers' section in a play-off to decide the challenger to Kobayashi Koichi Judan.

The 13th Fujitsu Cup Final

Cho Hun-hyun vs. Chang Hao

Black: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan

White: Chang Hao 9-dan

Komi: 5.5 points; time: 3 hours each

Played in Tokyo on August 12, 2000

Based on a commentary by Cho Hun-hyun.

Back in the 80s Cho Hun-Hyun, Nie Weiping, and Kobayashi Koichi, were referred to as ‘the three musketeers’. Unfortunately, Nie and Kobayashi did badly in international tournaments (Kobayashi did manage to win the Fujitsu Cup in 1997, but Nie never won anything), so commentators of the go scene started to refer to them as ‘toothless tigers’. In contrast, Cho has been regularly winning international titles since they began to proliferate at the beginning of the 90s. Already he has won six, and in August, even though he is approaching 50, he won his second Fujitsu Cup, raising his swag to seven (second only to Lee Chang-ho’s 13).





Figure 1 (1-28)

Figure 1 (1-28). *Retired?*

‘I’m retired. How would I know?’ was Cho Hun-hyun’s evasive answer when asked what he thought of his prospects in this year’s Fujitsu Cup. Indeed, his record in other tournaments since July 1 was a dismal 1-7. Coincidentally, his most recent loss (by half a point) was at the hands of Mok Jin-seok 5-dan, who also won the playoff for third place in this tournament. It seemed that Cho was

entering this important game in the worst possible condition and almost everybody agreed that it would be hard for him to win. On the other hand, his opponent was Chang Hao, China’s premier player, who has made it to the finals of a number of international tournaments; however, he has never managed to win the deciding game. This must have given some hope to Cho’s fans. Moreover, drawing black in a 5.5-komi game was seen as helping Cho.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2


Black 9 is a move that Cho occasionally plays in national tournaments. Black hopes that White will slide to A instead of 12. *Dia. 1* shows what would happen if White played this way: the marked stone is now well placed, since it is farther away from the strong white group than A or B, which are the main alternatives for Black 9. White 12 and 14 avoid this pattern. According to Cho, White 14 is sometimes played at 1 in *Dia. 2*, but White 14 seems to be the better choice.

Black 15-17 and 23-25, push-and-hane once and again, are the strongest moves. If Black played as in *Dia. 3* (next page), White would immediately cut at 2 and Black wouldn’t have a good answer. If Black protected at A instead of 1, White would turn at B, which is not to Black’s liking either.

After Black 27, cutting with White 28 is natural, but here it was best for White just to move out with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 4*. Why?



Dia. 3



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (28-62)

Figure 2 (28-62). A seesaw battle


According to feeling as well as shape, Black should be in trouble after the cut of White 28, but actually it is White who has all the difficulties. Therefore, White 28 was a careless overplay. With the counterattack of Black 31, the white group had serious problems. Instead of White 30, how about

31, which seems to be the right spot? According to Cho, 'That is the shape tesuji, but it has no follow-up.' Cho then showed *Dia. 5*. Even if Black lets White have his way by connecting with 2, he can look forward to the contact play at A after Black 6. If White dislikes this result and plays 3 at B, Black C puts him on the spot again, making miai of D and E.



Dia. 5

Chang's main problem was the inability to escape with the attachment of A. If he had tried to do so, as in *Dia. 6*, Black would immediately play 4. White's marked stones are pivotal, so he cannot sacrifice them. He'd want to play 5, but after Black slices through with the sequence to Black 14, White is in trouble. Trying for a capturing race against Black's stones on the right by sliding to White A would be met by Black B. Being generous, a mere seki would be the best White could hope for, but, if White's cutting stones are neutralized by being cut off from the center, the burden is on White because only he is left with stones floating in the center.



Dia. 6


It is painful for a professional to play a crude sequence like 32 to 36, but it couldn't be helped.

'The push of 39 was severe,' the Korean team-leader for this tournament, Han Cheol-kyun

6-dan, commented excitedly as if it were his own game. 'After pushing with 41 to 45, securing a good 30 points with 47 and 49 by sacrificing the stones at 31 and 39 was a clever strategy.'

One might feel compelled to continue with 47 at B, but that would complicate the game. It would be too optimistic to assume that White would follow orders and jump to C. White would probably play at 47 himself and settle his stones in what would otherwise be Black's territory.

In the course of the fighting up to 49, Black established a superior position, but that didn't last long. He might have become overconfident, since Black 53 was thoughtless.



Dia. 7

Han Cheol-kyun now commented with a concerned voice: 'If Cho Hun-hyun loses this game, this might be the losing move.' After the game Cho himself expressed regret for it as well. Following the proverb 'make life for yourself first, then attack,' Black should have first taken care of his center stones by jumping to 1 in *Dia. 7*. Aiming at the aji of A, which is activated by Black B (53 in the game) is not urgent. The counter of White 54 was sharp. Because of his weak group in the center, Black was unable to fight by pushing at D, then cutting. After White 62, it's hard for Black to decide on his next move.

Figure 3 (63–85). Greed filled with hallucination

Cho lost his composure after playing the marked stone (53 in *Figure 2*), and, once this happens, it is unlikely that a player will regain it and come up with good moves — one mistake leads to another one, and Black 63 illustrates this. For a few points more in the corner, Black allows White to play naturally at 64. After the game, when Han Cheol-kyun said to Cho 'Perhaps it would have been better just to protect the group at 65,' Cho re-

plied: 'Right. The exchange of 63 for 64 was bad. But 65 wouldn't be correct either. I should have attached at A.' That would lead to *Dia. 8*. White 2 is big, but Black can be satisfied with securing the center, which is at least preferable to the result in the game, where Black is left with a serious weakness at B.






Figure 3 (63–85)



Dia. 8


Cho was well aware that it would be logical to defend the center group, but then White would get too many points on the left side, thus Black 67. The aim of White 70 is to torment Black to the utmost. Cho is now on the hook, especially after Black 77, the next doubtful move. Not only was it greedy, he also was hallucinating. Black should just have made a base for his stones with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 9* (next page). That way he would not only live, but also indirectly help the center stones when he pokes his head out with 5. One might be reluctant to give White so much territory on the left, but Black has

taken sufficient profit previously so that he is in the lead.



Dia. 9

The trouble with Black 77 is that the black group is not yet completely alive after 1 in Dia. 10. Of course, this group is not in immediate danger, as it has A and the cut at B, but if White becomes a bit thicker around here, White 1 would be fearsome. When Cho discovered White 1 in Dia. 10, the game had already proceeded to 85. It was now time for the lunch break; one might wonder if he was able to enjoy his meal.



Dia. 10





Figure 4 (86-100)

Figure 4 (86-100). Continued suffering


While Cho was wondering whether or not Chang was aware of White A, Chang played 86, the first move after the lunch break. Was this a simple probe or was it secretly aiming at the group on the left side, following the proverb 'rumble in the east to attack in the west'? That immediately became a moot point, as Black went wrong by answering with 87. Cho intended to defend with B if White had played 92, but it's obvious that this was one-sided thinking. White 88 is a forceful move and shows that Black should have immediately played 87 at 1 in Dia. 11.



Dia. 11

Black 7 at A also looks like a good move, but one has to keep in mind that after White B and Black C, happily exchanged in sente for White D, Black has to come back to defend at E. Black 7 loses the right to exchange C for D in sente, but the fact that the two marked stones are not yet captured was the reason Cho favored Black 7 over Black A.


'After an attachment play hane!' That's an often heard proverb. Indeed, one would really like to play a hane in this position. But here it would be an overplay, as Black has no good defense after White 4 in Dia. 12. In particular, one might wonder why Black played the marked stone to begin with, so Black 87 has to be criticized.



Dia. 12

Painful though it was, Black had to endure White 88, and the continuation to 93 was inevitable. Especially at 93, Cho was suffering and he later said that he couldn't control his complex emotions. He was extremely concerned about how to answer if White had played at C, since the threat of White A was still looming. But actually the seemingly absurd move of 94 was played.

Obviously 94 is also a point that White would like to play, but there was absolutely no reason for him to refrain from playing at C and rush to 94 instead. Black would be in trouble after 1 in *Dia. 13*. If Black blocked at A, White could go for the kill with B; if Black defended at C, White would play A in sente. Black would have a difficult game.



Dia. 13

In any case, the position was still painful for Cho. How else could it be? The anxiety over White C in *Figure 5* remained unchanged, and the right center group was vulnerable as well.






Figure 5 (101-119)

Figure 5 (101-119). Cho's latent strength

In the course of defending the center group, Cho played another questionable move. The marked exchange (99-100 from *Figure 4*) was played with an eye on Black 3, but that was another miscalculation. He overlooked White 4. As Black's group is in danger of dying, Black 5 is inevitable. But then White can play elsewhere, as Black A is simply captured by White B. Cho played 3 because he expected Chang to answer with 1 or A in *Dia. 14*. That leaves a weakness at B, and if White protects, there is a one-move difference from the game.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Accordingly, Black 99 in *Figure 4* ought to have been played somewhere else. After some analysis with Ryu Shikun 7-dan, Oya Koichi 8-dan suggested *Dia. 15*. Giving White a chance to play 6 is nothing compared to securing life for the black group. After the game Cho nodded in agreement. He himself had thought about this variation, and, of course, he would have followed it had he only seen White 4 in the game. Cho added, however, that even in *Dia. 15* Black's path to life is troubled, as White can play A and get quite a bit of profit out of the attack.



Dia. 16

White 6 demonstrates Chang's skill, though even now it would be simpler just to play 12 and make miai of 6 and C. First, White 6 is possible because Black cannot fight back with 1 in *Dia. 16*. Although that would win the capturing race up to 15, White 14 and the remaining sente moves should be sufficient to capture the marked black group with A. Despite some errors earlier in the game, this is something Cho did not overlook.

Black 7 is a sharp counter. The more you look at it, the more you can appreciate it. Here Cho's latent strength reveals itself. After the exchange up to 15, Black has nothing to complain about.

White 16 is impossible to understand. How can White let Black live so easily?!





Figure 6 (116-144)

32 at the marked white stone;
37: at the marked black stone; 40: at 34


Figure 6 (116-144). *Bad judgement*

Chang must have felt his position was all right or else he wouldn't have let the black group on the left side live so easily. Cho claimed that the game was won when he secured life with 17 and 19, so White 16 was the losing move. Clearly, White should have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17* and used sente to go after the black group with 5. Asked if the black group would die, Cho replied: 'It's impossible to resign here and now, so I would attach at A and grope for a way to live, but frankly, I wouldn't have much confidence.'




Dia. 17

As indicated before, it seemed that Chang did not feel he was behind, and indeed with 24 and 26, later followed by White 44, White constructed quite a bit of territory. But, according to Cho's analysis, that was not enough to win.



Dia. 18

Some Japanese professionals were pondering a strange possibility. How about attaching at A before playing 44? *Dia. 18* resolves the curiosity. White won't be able to live in the corner, but up to 7 he could gain a few points. When Cho was shown this variation afterwards he commented: 'Well, there seems to be some gain for White there, but Black is a little ahead, so the result is unchanged. For reference, he gave *Dia. 19* as a continuation, where Black has a better position after 9 and 11. If White plays A instead of 8, Black 8 would force White to connect at B, and Black C would destroy White's center; the results are all the same.



Dia. 19





Figure 7 (145-203)

54: at the white triangled stone;
66, 72, 84, 102: at the circled stone;
69, 79, 99: at 61; 77 at the black
triangled stone; 82: at 74

Figure 7 (145–203). *A toothless tiger?*


Entering the endgame Cho was slightly ahead, and he played carefully with the experience of a veteran. Judging this game only by its endgame, it was a complete victory for Cho.

Black 47 was a first-class gambit. White 48 was an overplay. White might not have realized that Cho was hoping for the cut of 56. Indeed, White fell for the trap with 56, but the original mistake was White 48. The best reply to 47 would have been White 75, but that still wouldn't have turned the game around. From Chang's standpoint, 48 and 56 could be seen as do-or-die moves. But how did he feel when he had to submissively answer 57 with 58 and again 59 with 60? Was there really no choice?



Dia. 20

First, *Dia. 20* helps us to understand White 58. After Black 2 there's nothing White can do. Capturing with either A or B will win for Black. But why allow Black to take with 61?



Dia. 21


Dia. 21 shows there was no alternative to White 60. After Black 6, White can't escape with

A, which would be captured by Black B–White C–Black D. Black 65 would be the proper time for Chang to resign, but it's understandable that he needed some time to convince himself that he had lost such an important game. The rest of the game can be seen as Chang's efforts to come to terms with his defeat.

Finally, *Dia. 22* shows an interesting move that wasn't played in the game. It shows why White couldn't cut at A with 68. Black would cut with 2, and if White continues with A, Black B to F, followed by Black G, would capture the marked stone. White could capture the ko at H instead of 2, but that would be a picnic ko for Black that White can't fight.

Cho disparagingly calls himself a 'toothless ti-

ger', but, as the old saying goes, 'The old lion still has teeth.'




Dia. 22

White resigns after Black 203.


From *Baduk*, September 2000. Translated by Franz-Josef Dickhut.

Six Life-and-Death Problems


Answers start on page 54




Problem 1: Black to play and live.




Problem 2: Black to play and kill White.




Problem 3: Black to play and live.



Problem 4: Black to play and kill White.



Problem 5: Black to play and live.



Problem 6: Black to play and kill White.

The 55th Honinbo Title Match

Cho Sonjin vs. O Meien

We continue our report from GW89 on the Honinbo title match. After his disastrous start, where he misread a ladder, O came back to take the title 4-2.

Game Two

White: Cho Sonjin Honinbo

Black: O Meien 9-dan

Played on June 7 & 8, 2000

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan





Figure 1 (1-39)

Figure 1 (1-39). New and careful moves


O took a fresh approach to the Chinese-style opening by playing Black 7. Usually Black pincers at 1 in *Dia. 1*, but White can counter with 2 and 4, preventing Black 'a'. O's idea was to start with Black 7, then play around A if White answered at 10. Cho thwarted that plan with White 8.



Dia. 1

O spent 64 minutes on Black 23, and 65 minutes on Black 37. He wanted to play 23 at B, but

was worried that White might cut at C. At 37, he was thinking about expanding into the center with Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. These moves would work well with his power at the bottom, and if White played 2 at 'a', Black could reply at 'b', but, for one reason or another, O rejected this sequence.



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (37-75). Mutual pessimism

After compromising with Black 37 and 39, O felt pessimistic about his opening. His pessimism was reduced when White played 48 in the center, instead of taking the top left corner with 54, but he was still in no mood to connect at A when White played 56 and 58. Cho, however, thought that White was losing at this stage.




Figure 2 (37-75)




Figure 3 (76-119)

Figure 3 (76-119). Toward a close finish

If Cho was actually behind, his hopes brightened when he played 76 and 78. Defying expectations (White 83 had been predicted next), he dug in and made two eyes with 80 to 92. Then, since his top left corner was alive, he ignored Black 101 to play White 106. A half-point finish loomed ahead, with the outcome likely to depend on luck more than anything else.





Figure 4 (120-247)

108: takes ko at 102; 112: connects at 105;
126: takes ko at 122; 127: connects at 20;
137: takes ko at 123; 140: takes ko at 122;
142: connects to the right of 114;
143: takes ko at 123; 147: connects at 122

Figure 4 (120-247). First win for O

Black 31 was very big, because if White ignored it, Black could play 1 and 3 in sente in *Dia. 3*. In the center, White found it hard to enlarge his territories, while Black gained slightly from 73, 77, and 79. O slapped his knee in alarm when White played 102 and 104, but in the end he turned out to have the game won by the predicted margin.



Dia. 3

Black wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

From *Shukan Go* (June 19). Translated by James Davies.

Game Three

White: O Meien 9-dan

Black: Cho Sonjin Honinbo

Played on June 21 & 22, 2000

Commentary by Sakata Eio 9-dan





Figure 1 (1-47)

27, 35: takes ko at 19; 30, 40: takes ko at 20

Figure 1 (1-47). Breaking even on the first day

Showing confidence after winning the second game, O played White 12 in an unusual position on the fourth line in order to ignore Black 13 and in-

vade the corner at 14. This did not necessarily produce a good result, however, because White had to leave a ko open to take sente at 32. White 34 and 36 worked well, but they did not stop Black from taking the ko with 35.



Dia. 1
4: connects

Though large, Black 39 and 41 were dubious because they made the remaining pieces of White's group light. Black could have taken the lead by playing 1 to 9 in *Dia. 1*. Instead, the first day ended with the game about even at Black 47.




Figure 2 (48-100)

Figure 2 (48-100). A successful invasion

Black sacrificed 51 to link under in safety with 53 to 61. These apparently negative moves were shrewdly judged; any feeling that they gave White

the lead vanished when Black invaded deeply at 65. Moving White 64 to A to prevent the invasion would have let Black play in the center, without completely securing the top left corner.

Suddenly surrounded by Black 73, White found the only possible way to break out with 74 to 80, but Black 81 and 85 caught him by surprise. He cut at 86, then had to let Black capture the cutting stone, so Black's invasion ended successfully. Black now led, although White 100 kept the game close.




Figure 3 (101-154)

24: takes ko left of 21; 26: connects right of 20;
27, 33: takes ko; 30: takes ko

Figure 3 (101-154). The lead shifts.

Black 1 may have lost the lead, since it let White play 2 and 4 without having to defend against the cut at 43. Black would have done better to exchange 9 for 10, then play 1 at 4.

Black 19 was the correct answer to White 18. Black 20-White 19-Black 25-White A would have started a big ko that Black lacked the ko threats to win, although O was not sure of that when he played White 18.

Black 37 was a mistake, giving White a definite lead. Black should have played the lettered sequence from B to F. White also made mistakes, however, at 48 (should have been 49) and 54 (should have been G).





Figure 4 (155-224)

75: captures four stones at 71;
81, 109: takes ko right of 78; 84, 112: takes ko at
78; 114: connects right of 78; 123: connects at 70

Figure 4 (155-224). Black misses his chance.

Black now had a chance to win back the lead by playing 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 2*. White has no better continuation than the one shown from White 6 to Black 11. If the game is played out from this position, Black wins by half a point.



Dia. 2

Black 55 was therefore correct, but 57 was misplaced. White took control of the situation with 62 to 76. Black then lost further points in the top right corner, so the final score did not show how close the game had been.

White wins by 4 1/2 points.

From *Shukan Go* (July 3). Translated by James Davies.

Game Four

White: Cho Sonjin Honinbo

Black: O Meien 9-dan

Played on June 28 & 29, 2000

Commentary by Ogoshi Ichiro 8-dan

Figure 1 (1-40). A twice-tried opening

The opening through 17 mirrored a game from the Ing Cup in which O (Black) had defeated China's Ma Xiaochun. Ma had played White 18 at 29, and O had played Black B. Afterward, Otake Hideo had pointed out that Black B set up a good attack on the top white group at A, but O had failed to play Black A.




Figure 1 (1-40)

Cho seemed to think that the right side was bigger than anything else because he extended to White 18. He regretted White 20, which gave Black an ideal capping play at 21. He said he should have played 20 at 21 himself. To recover from this mistake, he thought for over an hour, then invaded the left side at 22.

After White 40, O had to seal the next move to end the first day of play. Black C would have been a simple choice, but O took his time, perhaps musing about Black A.

Figure 2 (41-69). Black forges ahead.

The sealed move was unexpectedly Black 41, followed by 43, letting White bend out at 44 but

preparing for Black 47. This move attacked both the top white group and the marked stone on the right side. When White defended the right side with 48, Black 49 redoubled the attack at the top. White dodged into the corner with 50, leading to an exchange that put Black ahead.





Figure 2 (41-69)



Dia. 1

Black now became conservative. Black 63 could have been played more boldly at A, daring White to reply at 63. Black 69 could have been played at 1 in *Dia. 1*. This was a move that Black could also have made earlier, if he had been able to pick the right time.

Figure 3 (70-121). Timing and other mistakes

When finally played, Black 77 was mistimed. Black expected White to answer at 104, to be followed by Black A, but White forced at 78, then dove in at 80. Using 80 and 82 as a sacrifice, White

played 84 to 88 in sente, then enveloped 77 by extending at 90. White 94 was also good, and if White had strengthened the center instead of playing 98, he might now have had the advantage.




Figure 3 (70-121)

Black would have won if he had played 113 at 114. After the game, O could not get over this mistake. Black 119 was another mistake. Black B-White C-Black 120 would have been better.




Figure 4 (122-166)

42: takes ko at 36; 45: takes ko at 39

Figure 4 (122-166). A dramatic wedge

Black still seemed headed for victory when he won the ko fight at 47, but he had overlooked the devastating wedge at White 58. White 60 captured

four stones. If Black tries to save them with A, White B captures some stones in the center. Black could have prevented this by playing 51 at 52, but that might not have been enough to win the game.

Black resigns after White 166.

From *Shukan Go* (July 10). Translated by James Davies.

Game Five

White: O Meien 9-dan

Black: Cho Sonjin Honinbo

Played on July 4 & 5, 2000

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-58)

Figure 1 (1-58). The large avalanche

This game was played in a mountain inn, on a board that had been used by Sakata and Takagawa in the 1961 Honinbo title match. The opening was fittingly classic, at least as far as White 22. Black 23 is a modern move, however, and the variation that followed White 26 has rarely been seen. Both players disclaimed any special knowledge of this joseki.

If Black had answered White 44 at 48, White would have played A. The ensuing fight is difficult and, in the players' opinion, dangerous for Black. Black 45 looked timid, but it showed good judgment, turning White 38 into a bad move. White 54 and 56 were understandable in the heat of combat, but since White would eventually have to return to defend here, he should have defended at once by playing 54 at B.





Figure 2 (59-109)

Figure 2 (59-109). Black misses a squeeze.

When White defended at 62, Black predictably invaded at 63. In the subsequent fighting, White took a risk at 68. He should have connected at 69, inadequate though that may have seemed, followed by Black A-White 72-Black B-White C. Black could have squeezed White by playing 71 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Through 16, White gets about the same amount of territory as in the game, but Black's position is stronger and White cannot play 'a' in sente, so Black is winning.



Dia. 1

White 92, with its implications of center expansion, was an interesting move. Black 103 was dangerously heavy; Black should have pushed up at D. After Black 109, White had an opportunity to take the lead with E.





Figure 3 (110-151)

Figure 3 (110-151). Black's rise and fall

Instead of playing 19, O carefully read out the relevant ladders, then cut at White 10 and captured four black stones through 16. That was big, but 15 and 17 were bigger, putting Black comfortably ahead.



Dia. 2

No sooner had Black taken the lead, however, than he started to give it away, first by not playing 21 at 24, then by not playing 23 at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Following White 6 in *Dia. 2*, Black can harass White by cutting at 'a' in the center and playing 'b' on the right side. Black could still have won by playing 29 at 45, but White 30 and 32 made things very close, with Black A-White B now a critical issue.




Figure 4 (152-224)

105: connects below 73

Figure 4 (152-224). Another seesaw endgame

O thought he had won when he played 52, but this move lost at least a point and could have cost him the game. If he had played correctly here (White A-Black B-White 57), he would have been half a point ahead.

Black's mistake was to play 69 before 73, letting White capture 69 with 74. Black 77 was insufficient compensation, and Black 77 at C, threatening to cut at 96, does not work if White replies at D.

White wins by 1 1/2 points.

From *Shukan Go* (July 17). Translated by James Davies.

Game Six

White: Cho Sonjin Honinbo

Black: O Meien 9-dan

Played on July 17 & 18, 2000

Commentary by O Meien 9-dan and Oya Koichi 8-dan

Figure 1 (1-21). A lapse of memory

Go Seigen commented that White should have played 8 at A. It is true that Black 11 balances well with Black 3 and 7, but at this stage almost anything is playable.

Black 17 was an unnatural move born from too much cogitation. Normally Black plays high, at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black was worried that White would re-

ply at 2, then invade later at 'a', but that was a minor issue in comparison with Black's magnificent large knight's moves at 3 and 5. If Black 5 looks frivolous, Black can play 'b' instead.






Figure 1 (1-21)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

5: connects left of 1

Black had forgotten about White 18 and 20. Black 21 was a strained reply. Black wanted to cut

at 1 in *Dia. 2*, but the sequence through 6 strengthens White on the upper side.






Figure 2 (22-62)

Figure 2 (22-62). Black forces an exchange.

Black's punishment for his memory lapse was to be beaten down at 22, then cut at 26. White kept on the march with 28 through 32, patching up his cutting point at 30 and threatening *Dia. 3*. Rather than submit to this squeeze, Black played 33, then started a counterattack at 39, but his position was too weak for him to attack strongly.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Black would have liked to play 41 at 1 in *Dia. 4*, but he had little hope of being able to fight the ko, so Black 1 would just have given up other potential. If White plays 48 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, as perhaps most amateurs would do, Black plays 2 and 4, suddenly getting a very good position.



Dia. 5

The encounter ended at Black 53, with White coming out perhaps somewhat ahead. White 62 was unusual, but it seems to have been good in this position. Dia. 6 shows the normal joseki.



Dia. 6





Figure 3 (63-100)

Figure 3 (63-100). A fateful hane

Black 63 looked right but it wasn't. The proper move was Black 1 in Dia. 7. If Black can add a

stone at 'a' or 'b', he can then kill the corner with 'c'. If Black had played this way, he would still have been behind, but White would not have had an easy win. The sequence actually played left only the puny threat of Black A, which starts an unfavorable two-step ko. During the game, Black counted this corner as two or three points of black territory. Due in part to Black's mistake, White had done better than the joseki.



Dia. 7

White 80 was a typical Cho Sonjin move. It had its feet on the ground. One's first inclination is to expand at 84 or 87, but then Black plays B, and whether White's framework will actually solidify into territory is an open question.

Kobayashi Koichi thought that White should have played 88 at 92, but he was assuming that the upper side would become white territory. That assumption was doubtful.

White 90 was a bad move that lost the lead and perhaps the game. No one was aware of this at the time, but careful investigation later failed to turn up any way for White to win after this point, or even to make the game close. If White had played 90 at 93, not giving Black any leverage, Black would still have been in difficulties.

Figure 4 (101-170). From advantage to victory

One move that was investigated later was White 1 in Dia. 8, as an alternative to White 6 in the game. The trouble with White 1 is that White has to answer Black 2 at 3, so Black can get a good exchange with 4 and 6. If White plays 3 in Dia. 9, Black plays 4 to 16, leaving White in a sorry state because of the cutting point at 'a'. Now you can

also see that Black should have played 5 at 17 in the game, but all this only came to light later.






Figure 4 (101-170)
49: connects right of 13




Dia. 8



Dia. 9


White played 6 to make 10 sente. Black realized that, and countered with 9 and 11. These moves were necessary, although it's hard to show why in a diagram. Black did not lose anything in the resulting exchange, but if he had held 17 in reserve, watching for a chance to play as in *Dia. 9*, he could probably have wrapped the game up more quickly.



Dia. 10

Now that Black had become strong in the center, White had to play defensively at 20 and 22, which must have hurt. Black could have played 35 at 1 in *Dia. 10*. The hane at 'a' lets Black play 'b' and 'c' in sente, so he is safe from capture, especially as White has the cutting point at 'd' to deal with.

White 50 was a puzzling move, because it seemed as if White could have made a bid for victory by reducing the center at A. The truth is that White A would not have worked, because of what Black could still do on the upper side.




Dia. 11

Black 55 settled the issue. If White replies with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 11*, Black lives by playing 6. If White plays 5 at 'a', Black gets a risk-free ko with Black 6–White 'b'–Black 'c'–White 'd'. Black 69 finally put an end to what had been a difficult struggle.

Figure 5 (171–262). A landslide victory

Black became certain of victory when he played 77. Note that Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12* would be gote, letting White get 83 in the game; moreover, if White answered 3 at 'a', Black would lose two points because of White 'b' next. Cho was behind by a wide margin, but to calm his nerves, he played the game out to the end.



Dia. 12

Black wins by 10 ½ points.

From *Gekkan Go Warudo*, September 2000. Translated by James Davies.





Figure 5 (171–262)

103: connects at 84; 125: captures three stones left of 106; 132: captures left of 105; 155: connects left of 107; 161: connects left of 101; 162: connects left of 106


Two Endgame Problems

In the following two problems, you are asked to find the best moves for both Black and White. Determine which side wins and by how much. No prisoners have been taken. What may seem like the biggest move may not be the correct one. There are a number of tesujis that must be found and sente–gote relationships that must be considered.

The answers, beginning on page 58, start with an amateur playing these positions with black against a professional. We then show a professional playing black against another professional.



Problem 1. Black to play




Problem 2. Black to play

The point 'a' is worth six points, but how many points is capturing the marked stones worth?


Answers to Life-and-Death Problems

Problem 1




Failure

There is a proverb that advises us to play in the center of a symmetrical position. Black 1 follows this advice, but his stones are dead after the sequence to White 8.



Correct Answer


Turning at Black 1 is the vital point. It threatens to make an eye at 2. Black next plays 3, again threatening to make an eye, so White plays 4. But Black gets eye shape when he plays 5.



Variation


After Black 1, White might counterattack with 2, but Black 3 is a sharp response. When Black plays 5, he is alive with two eyes.

Problem 2




Failure

The atari of Black 1 fails. White sacrifices two stones with 2 and 4, and White is alive.



Correct Answer


Black 1 is the vital point of this position. White connects with 2. Black plays 3, threatening to throw in a stone at 4, so White connects there himself. Black now ataris all the white stones with 5. After White captures with 6 —



Continuation


Black captures with 1 and White cannot make two eyes.

Problem 3



The tesuji

Sacrificing two stones by descending to the edge with 1 is the tesuji.




Failure

The throw-in of Black 1 would be almost instinctive to a strong player, but it is a mistake. Black can capture two stones after 3 and 5, but he will not get a second eye. White links up his stones when he captures at 6.

Continued on page 64


Ladder Problems

Problem 1. White to play




After White cuts at 1, Black extends to 2. White has to save his three stones on the right or he will suffer a catastrophic loss. However, the ladder doesn't seem to favor White because of the two marked stones at the top. What should White do?

Problem 2. Black to play




After White 1 and 3, the hane of Black 4 is a powerful move. White 5 at A is the correct response. Instead, White cuts with 5. How can Black take the initiative on the left side?

Problem 3. Black to play




Black 3 is a joseki move, but Black can play here only if the ladder is in his favor. What should Black do after White 10?

Problem 4. Black to play




White has just cut with the marked stone, and the seven black stones at the top are in tatters. If Black could capture the marked stone in a ladder, he would have a won game. But the ladder doesn't work. Is there anything else Black can do?

Answer to Problem 1




Problem 1. Failure

White can't capture with 1 because the marked black stone breaks the ladder: Black 46 is atari. The marked white stones are now dead.




Problem 1. The ladder works

If Black defends on the left side with 1, White ataris with 2, and the ladder cleanly passes between the two marked black stones.




Problem 1. Correct Answer

White 1 is the correct move. Black resists with 2 and White ataris with 3. Next —




Problem 2. Lacking a plan

Black 1 and 3 force White to answer with 2 and 4, but Black has no follow-up moves.




Problem 1. Continuation

The sequence continues to White 4. Black is in a quandary. White is threatening to capture the black stones in a ladder with A, but, if Black defends by playing at A himself, White will play at B and save his three stones in the lower right.



Problem 2. Black is alive, but —


Black 1 is the correct move, but crawling along the second line with 3 to 7, then making eye shape with 9 and 11, is submissive. Black has a better way to play.



Problem 2. Correct Answer


After exchanging 1 for 2, Black must play 3. Black is now threatening two ladders: one at A and another at B. No matter which side White defends, Black will secure his stones.

Answer to Problem 3




Problem 3. Failure

Crawling along the second line with 1 to 5 is futile. Even if Black lives, the wall White gets facing the outside is overwhelming.



Correct Answer



Problem 3

Continuation


Problem 3. Correct Answer

Black 1 and 3 is the tesuji combination. Black is now threatening to capture stones with a ladder at A or B.

Problem 3. Continuation


If White extends to 1, Black will capture the two marked stones with 2. White will turn at 3, but Black threatens the corner with 4 and 6, then extends to 8, securing his stones at the bottom.

Answer to Problem 4




Problem 4. Failure

Black 1 and 3 are crude moves which just seal the fate of the five marked black stones. Moreover, the four black stones to the right are heavy and will come under attack.




Problem 4. Correct Answer

Black 1 is a skillful tesuji. It may seem as if this move is unrelated to the seven black stones on the left, but, as will become clear in the next two diagrams, that is not the case.



Problem 4. Continuation

If White defends with 1, Black starts the ladder with 2 and 4, then ataris with 6. Black is now threatening to capture three stones at A or one at B, and killing the three white stones in the top right.



Problem 4. Variation

Problem 4. Variation

White might descend toward the edge with 1, then play 3 after Black blocks with 2. The threat of a ladder is eliminated, but Black can build a three-stone wall in the center in sente with the sequence to 10. White must play 11 and Black maps out a large-scale moyo with the large-knight's move of 12.

Translated from the supplement to *Baduk*, July 2000.

Answers to the Endgame Problems

Problem 1

1. Amateur versus professional

First of all, we will show how one amateur played this endgame against a professional




Figure 1 (1-9)

A move in the lower left corner is certainly big, but Black 1 in *Figure 1* is not correct because it is gote and White can capture a stone in the lower left with 2 and 4.

As will become clear later, Black 5 is also a mistake. White defends with 6.

Black next captures three stones with 9.

Next, White plays both 10 and 12 in *Figure 2* in sente. After White connects at 16 in gote, Black takes sente to play 17, but he also ends in gote when he plays 19. Finally, White takes the last point with 20.




Figure 2 (10-20)

Figure 3 shows the position after all the neutral points are filled. Note that stones have been captured at the points marked X and they are included in the calculations on the next page.




Figure 3: The result
White wins by 7 points.

Black's territory:

Left side	= 20 points
Lower right corner	= 5 points
Upper right corner	= 6 points
Total	= 31 points

White's territory:

Bottom	= 22 points
(includes the captured stones at X)	
Top	= 9 points
Right side	= 7 points
Total	= 38 points

Professional versus professional

Next, we show how a professional played this endgame for Black with another professional playing White.





Figure 4 (1-5)

Black starts with 1 and 3 in *Figure 4*, enabling him to take profit in the lower left in sente.



Dia. 1

If White ataris with 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black connects at 2. White can't atari the three black stones because he is short of liberties. He must first capture a black stone before he can atari at the 1-1 point, but Black would then have time to capture the two white stones.

Black 5 is another interesting endgame tesuji.

In response to Black 5, White must connect at 6 in *Figure 5*, and Black will then exchange 7 for White 8.






Figure 5 (5-9)

Dia. 3 shows the efficacy of Black's moves. After White connects at 4 in *Dia. 2*, Black can play 5 and 7 in sente. If you look at *Figure 2*, the amateur ended in gote when he played Black 19.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Defending the lower right corner with Black 9 in *Figure 5* is a high-level tesuji. We will look at this move in *Figure 6*.





Figure 6 (9-12)


Black played 9 expecting White to play 10. Black now defends at 11 and the hane of White 'a' is no longer sente.

Suppose that White plays 2 and 4 in *Dia. 4* (next page) after Black descends to 1.

Instead of defending at 'a' in *Dia. 4*, which is the usual move, Black will play 5. This move defends against a white cut at 'a', and it also defends against a white cut to the left of 5. Thus, it becomes Black's privilege to exchange 'b' for 'c'.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

If Black plays the usual connection of Black 1 in *Dia. 5*, White can play 2 and 4 in sente. Now if we assume Black 'a' and White 'b', Black's territory in *Dia. 4* is one point bigger than in *Dia. 5*.

The final move in *Figure 6* is White 12, worth six points in gote.




Figure 7 (12-17)

After White 12 in *Figure 7*, Black exercises his right to play 13 and 15 in sente. He then connects at 17 for a gain of three and a half points. There are now three endgame points remaining.




Figure 8 (18-20)

The hane-and-connection of White 18 and 19 in *Figure 8* is worth two points. Finally, there is the one-point move of 'a' or the sequence White 'b'–Black 'c'–White 'd' remaining.






Figure 9 (21-23)

Black must connect at 21 in *Figure 9* before playing 23. White responds by connecting at 22 and Black takes the final point at 23.



Dia. 6

Suppose White answers Black 1 in *Dia. 6* with 2. Black will play 3, and White must eventually connect at 'a'.



Dia. 7

On the other hand, if Black first plays 1 in *Dia. 7*, White will gain a point by playing 2 and 4, and he doesn't have to connect at 'a' in *Dia. 6*.

Figure 10 shows the position after all the neutral points are filled. The point where a stone has been captured is marked by X and it is included in the calculations below. The result is a draw.




Figure 10: The result
A draw.

Black's territory:

Left side	= 14 points
Lower right corner	= 11 points
Upper right corner	= 6 points
Total	= 31 points

White's territory:

Bottom (includes the captured stone at X)	= 17 points
Top	= 8 points
Right side	= 6 points
Total	= 31 points

Problem 2

1. Amateur versus professional

First of all, we will show how one amateur played this endgame against a professional




Figure 1 (1-7)

The moves from Black 1 to 7 in Figure 1 are all sente, leaving White no choice but to respond directly.




Figure 2 (8-16)

The game ends uneventfully with the sequence to 16 in Figure 2.




Figure 3: The result
White wins by six points.

Figure 3 shows the position after all the neutral points are filled. Note that stones have been captured at the points marked X, and are included in the calculations below.

Black's territory:

Left side (includes the two captured stones at X)	= 15 points
Lower right corner	= 9 points
Upper right corner	= 5 points
Total	= 29 points

White's territory:

Bottom	= 7 points
Top to the center	= 18 points
Right side	= 10 points
Total	= 35 points

Professional versus professional

Next, we show how the professional played this endgame for Black with another professional playing White.






Figure 4 (1-3)

Sacrificing a stone with Black 1 in *Figure 4* is a skillful move that gains Black two points more than allowing White to connect at 2 as in *Figure 1*. Later, Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* force White to play two more moves (2 and 4) inside his territory, moves he didn't have to make in *Figure 1*.



Dia. 1

Black seems to sacrifice another stone with 3, but this is not really a sacrifice. Playing this way is two points better than simply playing at 'a'. If White connects at 2 in *Dia. 2*, Black can descend to 'b' and he not only gets four points from the two dead white stones, he also gets the point at 'a'. Answering Black 1 with White 'a' still leaves Black with a five-point gain after he plays 'b' (six points for the three captured white stones minus one point for the captured black stone).



Dia. 2

White captures at 4 in *Figure 5* to prevent Black from capturing another stone at the bottom. White 4 also threatens to link up to its allies on the left, so it is absolute sente.





Figure 5 (4-7)

Black 7 is probably a hard tesuji to see. White can't capture this stone with 2 in *Dia. 3* because Black can then atari with 3 and capture a white stone at the top with 'a'. If White runs away by extending to 'a', Black will follow him along the top and White will find his stones short of liberties. Play this sequence out and see it for yourself.



Dia. 3

Therefore, White must atari at 8 in *Figure 6* and let Black connect at 9, but Black ends in sente because White must defend at 10.






Figure 6 (8-17)

Black now plays 11 and 13 in *Figure 6*, forcing White to capture with 12 and 14.

Black 15 threatens to kill the white stones in the corner, so White must answer with 16.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Note that Black would end in gote if he simply played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*. But if White ignores 15, Black will cut at 1 in *Dia. 5*. If White 'a' next, Black ataris with 'b', and the white stones in the corner are dead.

Next, Black hanes at 17.





Figure 7 (17-21)

Black plays the hane and connection of 17 and 19 in *Figure 7*, and these moves assure him a one-point victory. Next, White plays 20 and the game ends when Black connects at 21.



*Figure 8: The result
Black wins by one point.*

Figure 8 shows the position after all the neutral points are filled. The points where stones have been captured are marked by Xs, and they are included in the calculations below.

Black's territory:

Left side and bottom	= 18 points
(includes the captured stones at X)	
Lower right corner	= 9 points
Upper right corner	= 6 points
Total	= 33 points

White's territory:

Bottom	= 8 points
(includes a captured stone around X)	
Top to the center	= 15 points
(includes the captured stones at X)	
Right side	= 9 points
Total	= 32 points

Black won by one point. However, Black 17 in *Figure 7* was not the best endgame move. *Figure 9* shows that Black could have won by two points if he had played 17 as here. After Black 19 —




Figure 9

White plays 20 in *Figure 10*, setting up a ko, and, after White 26, Black takes the ko with 27.




Figure 10

White makes a ko threat with 1 in *Figure 11* and the ko fight continues up to Black 24. White is out of ko threats, so Black can connect the ko at 3. We leave it to the reader to confirm that Black has won by two points.





Figure 11


6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24: takes ko at and around 3

Black 17 in *Figure 9* was not the only move. Black could have also attached at 1 in *Dia. 6*. If White 2, Black ataris with 3. We leave this as an exercise for the reader to verify that this move also leads to a two-point victory for Black.



Dia. 6


Answers to Life-and-Death Problems (Continued)



Correct Answer

After White captures with 2 in the tesuji diagram, Black must calmly play 1 and 3. White must capture with 4 and Black captures two stones with 5. There is no way that White can prevent the capture of his two stones in the corner.

Problem 4




Failure

Black 3: diagonally to the right of 2


Turning with Black 1 fails. White captures three stones with 2. Black plays back in with 3 to

spoil White's eye shape, but, after White 4, Black can't stop White from getting two eyes.



Correct Answer 1


Black 1 aims to give White a dead eye space. If White 2, Black plays 3 and White is dead. If he plays 'a', Black will atari with 'b'. If White 'b', Black 'a'.



Correct Answer 2


If White plays 2 in response to 1, Black kills White with 3 and 5.

Problem 5




Failure 1

If Black tries to set up a capturing race with 1 and 3, he loses it when White ataris with 6.



Failure 2

Black 1 and 3 in *Failure 2* also fail. The black stones are dead after White 8.




Correct Answer

Black must immediately play the hane of 1. It seems as if White will capture the black stones af-

ter White 4, but there is a surprising double snapback with 5 and 7. White will be able to capture some stones, but the main body of Black's group will get two eyes.


Problem 6




Failure

Pushing in with Black 1 results in a simple capturing race in which Black loses by one move.

Black 1 in *Correct Answer 1* is the vital point. If White captures with 2, Black ataris with 3 and the White stones on the left are easily captured.



Correct Answer 1



Correct Answer 2

If White responds to Black 1 with 2, White will find himself short of liberties after the sequence to Black 7.

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The Kiseido Go Server (KGS), written and maintained by William Shubert in Portland, Oregon, is now up and running. We at Kiseido would like to invite you to visit it, explore it, and perhaps play some games on it. The server can be accessed through Kiseido's home page at <http://www.kiseido.com>, or you can go to it directly at <http://kgs.kiseido.com>. There is no charge for playing games on this site, and this server works for Linux/Unix, Mac, and Windows.

Kiseido hopes to make KGS a place where go players of all ranks from all over the world can enjoy playing go. A friendly atmosphere, where number of strong players are playing instructional games with kyu-players, and commenting on the moves. Guo Juan, the 5-dan Chinese woman professional who resides in Holland, often uses this site to give lessons on line. In the near future, we plan to have other players of professional strength online to instruct amateur dan players.

うしろあてて見る河のあそび

